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1. Introduction 
The issue of abortion maintains a roughly equal divide between American adults into 
those for and against (Pew Research Center, 2017; 2019; Gallup, 2018). Due to this 
split it seems that the debate will not be settled soon and arguments often get intense. 
Indeed, the stakes are high: do restrictions on abortion rights wage war on women’s 
human rights, or are they there to stop mothers-to-be from murdering their babies out 
of convenience? Extreme as these views may sound, both do receive representation. 
My focus will be on the latter, looking at how and why abortion is morally condemned. 
This study utilizes an interdisciplinary framework connecting a cognitive account of 
morality with a quantitative corpus approach. 
By and large, abortion is seen as a moral issue in the US. In a 2017 report (ibid.), only 
one third of Americans said that abortion is not a moral issue, leaving a majority 
believing that it is. Moreover, just under half think that abortion is wrong, and 66% of 
conservatives think abortion should be illegal in all or most cases (Pew Research 
Center, 2018a). As will be seen, the conservative perspective often sees the fetus as a 
human being whose rights the state should have an interest in protecting. Since these 
views potentially influence legislation, they are consequential for everyone, not only 
pregnant women. This is because the legal status of abortion is associated with a 
variety of secondary effects (WHO, 2019), and because people’s moral opinions can 
change depending on their circumstances–both of which will be discussed later. 
The above and the lack of cognitively oriented approaches in previous research on 
abortion discourse make the moral condemnation of abortion a worthwhile topic for 
study. The material I use comes from the comment sections of abortion-related articles 
on various conservative news outlets: Breitbart, The Daily Wire, The Washington 
Times, and The Western Journal. These websites were chosen as material because they 
represent the pro-life position and commenters tend to strongly condemn abortion. I 
will combine an evolutionary psychological (EP) theory of morality with a critical 
discourse analytic (CDA) framework in order to make hypotheses about how abortion 
is condemned. A contemporary EP account of morality suggests that it is a 
coordination mechanism that enables people to assign the property of wrongness to 
specific actions, and to punish perpetrators in favor of victims. In addition, the emotion 
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of disgust can be implicated in making moral judgments. More precisely, the research 
questions are: 
(1) Is condemnation more likely to be expressed in terms of unambiguous actions 
than non-actions (e.g. murder vs. evil)? 
(2) How often are victims identified in comments, and are they humanized (e.g. 
embryo vs. child)? 
(3) How often are perpetrators identified in comments, and are they groups of 
people (e.g. Democrats)? 
(4) Is disgust expressed, or do commenters attempt to elicit disgust in others? 
A parallel goal (but not a proper research question) of this paper is to argue that an 
understanding of human evolved cognition can benefit critical approaches because 
critical research by definition makes claims about people’s behavior in social settings. 
Throughout the paper, by abortion I mean the procedure as defined by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (2018, p.2): “…abortion is defined as an intervention 
performed within the limits of state law by a licensed clinician…that is intended to 
terminate a suspected or known intrauterine pregnancy.” I will also use fetus to refer 
to the object of abortion for two reasons, which should not be taken to reflect 
dehumanization or any other personal bias. First, object of abortion is a rather clumsy 
phrase to use repeatedly. Second, fetus is a more accurate description because almost 
all abortions in the US are performed during the first trimester (ibid., p.1). Baby and 
child, on the other hand, also refer to born humans and are therefore less prototypical 
for this purpose. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the framework of CDA, the 
theoretical underpinnings of EP, and how they might be combined. I also present the 
idea of morality as a biological adaptation which serves to coordinate social action in 
fitness-enhancing ways, and review the relevant empirical findings. These are then 
used to formulate hypotheses about what linguistic condemnation should look like. 
Section 3 describes the material used and how it was examined using a fundamentally 
qualitative approach supported by quantitative corpus methods. Section 4 presents and 
comments on the results. In Sections 5 and 6 I evaluate the results and the limitations 
of the study, relate morality to possible sociopolitical implications including CDA 
itself, and finally consider paths for further research. 
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2. Background 
 
In this section I describe the goals and commitments of CDA as a socially oriented 
approach to the study of discourse. I also review some of its limitations. After outlining 
the theoretical underpinnings of EP, I discuss how it can be applied to language 
research. Then, based on EP theorizing grounded in an abundance of empirical work, 
I explain what morality fundamentally is, how human moral cognition functions, and 
how that should manifest in language use. This also lays the groundwork for 
discussing some of the social implications in Section 5. Finally, I review some 
previous results on abortion research and relate them to my framework. 
 
2.1. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
This study is situated within the larger framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
CDA attempts to uncover how linguistic means can be used to gather and exert power 
in society and politics. Power, in CDA, does not usually mean physical power, but 
rather the capacity to influence other people’s minds by discursive means (van Dijk, 
2015, p.466–469). From this perspective, politicians are an example of powerful 
people because they speak publicly and can draw significant media attention. Indeed, 
discourse analysis focusing on political discussions is a very relevant object of 
investigation since CDA takes an explicit political stance in attempting to “challenge 
social inequality” (ibid., p. 466) and prioritizes historical change with respect to social 
issues (Fairclough, 1993, p.137). 
I will use the word discourse as synonymous with “spoken or written language use,” 
while focusing mostly on its social nature (ibid., p.134). Language use does not 
typically occur in a vacuum, but is instead a form of social influence in part 
constructed upon the speaker’s ideologies or motivations. For example, news can be 
seen “not as a reflection of reality but as a product shaped by political, economic, and 
cultural forces” (van Dijk, 2015, p.477). A naïve view of discourse may consider it to 
be a matter of cooperation by exchanging information and truth-seeking arguments, 
but sometimes we are motivated to distort the relationship between language and 
reality. One could describe abortion as murder, for instance, or they might argue that 
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abortion relates to the mother’s freedom to choose for herself. Van Dijk (2015, p.473) 
suggests that metaphor and lexicon can be used in ways like this by the speaker to 
reinforce his views. 
Since CDA aims to expose and ultimately alter societal power relations, it often 
focuses on discourses whose purpose is to represent groups of people in negative ways 
which can be used to justify and perpetuate the subordinate status of these groups. 
Sometimes the surface representations can be conspicuous. For instance, refugees and 
immigrants can be depicted as asylum shoppers (Moore, 2013) or as a burden to 
national resources (Hart, 2013) for the purpose of furthering anti-immigration 
agendas. Similarly, Caldas-Coulthard & Moon (2010) showed how British 
newspapers describe men and women differently and argued that this can uphold 
harmful gender stereotypes. But sometimes, it is argued, the superficial features of 
language can seem unprejudiced and yet serve a discriminatory agenda. For example, 
whereas explicit references to ethnicities may not be mentioned in discussions about 
the possible costs of immigration, they can nonetheless be motivated by racist 
ideologies (van Dijk, 2000a; 2000b). The devious aspect of this is that specific types 
of argumentation can exploit unconscious cognitive biases which predispose us to 
make commonsensical but logically invalid inferences (Hart, 2010, pp.73–80; 2013). 
These correspond to what are sometimes called opaque effects in CDA (Fairclough, 
2013, p.28). While I do not focus on language effects, abortion and the politics 
surrounding it are a matter of power; as I will discuss, the function of morality is to 
place limitations on other people’s behavior. 
CDA does not only aim to describe the ability to use language to create power 
structures or how speakers use language to further their aims; it is also explanatory 
(Fairclough, 2013, p.42–43). This is why it may adopt ideas from other disciplines. 
But it is not always clear how well the claims about language causing social effects 
are justified. Chilton (2005, p.22) asserts that CDA has been unsuccessful in producing 
any real understanding about how humans interact with language, which, given the 
assumption that language use is a significant factor in human social issues, is at the 
very least problematic. Accordingly, “[n]ext to nothing is known about whether 
[nominalisations or agent-less passives, or intertextual cross-overs] do really have any 
cognitive effects and thus social action effects” (ibid., p.45). Jones (2007, p.338) has 
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put forth similar criticisms, arguing that the tools of “conventional descriptive 
linguistics and pragmatics” are simply inadequate for making claims about complex 
social relations. Indeed, “the grandiose claims CDA practitioners have made about the 
augmented or pre-eminent role of language in society have never been substantiated 
or even coherently explained” (ibid., p.356). This might be taken to suggest that CDA 
could be strengthened by empirical evidence or insights from other disciplines which 
are successful in explaining human behavior. 
Whatever role language plays in human social interaction, it should be kept in mind 
that any effects language use may have are mediated by our minds. Therefore it seems 
that understanding human cognition is essential in analyzing the relation between 
language and society: “[c]ognition is the necessary interface that links discourse as 
language use and social interaction with social situations and social structures” (van 
Dijk, 2015, p.472). One way to attempt to understand language use and its interplay 
with cognition and social issues is to apply knowledge about the organization of the 
human mind to the examination of discourse. What has organized the human mind, is 
evolution. 
 
2.2. Evolutionary psychology (EP) 
There have been recent studies showing how evolutionary psychology (EP) can be 
used in analyzing language features and explaining their potential effects on people 
(O’Halloran, 2005; Hart, 2011; 2013). EP is an interdisciplinary field connecting 
evolutionary biology with cognitive science (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). The basic 
premise of the discipline is that because our bodies are the result of evolutionary 
pressures, the same must apply to the brain and mind. Biologists may often focus on 
the evolution of animal morphology, speciation, etc., but evolutionary psychologists 
are interested in the evolution of human cognition: why is it that a specific faculty of 
the mind exists in the first place? The field centers on adaptations: these are 
psychological mechanisms that have been selected for in evolutionary history because 
they helped our ancestors in reproduction and survival. These adaptations are called 
modules, and they correspond with neural circuits in the brain (Ermer, Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2007, p.154). 
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Some examples of modules are those related to fear and anger processing. Fear is a 
response to threats–predators, heights, natural catastrophes, etc.–and it facilitates 
aversion through several bodily, perceptual, and other cognitive changes ultimately 
for the purpose of gene preservation (Cosmides & Tooby, 2008, pp.118–119). 
Similarly, anger is elicited by cues signaling disregard or harms to one’s welfare and 
it enables us to correct the behavior of others (ibid., pp.131–132). Both psychological 
responses, therefore, predispose us to respond to the environment in adaptive ways. 
The postulation that the brain consist of modules which have their own respective 
domains of function is called massive modularity (Carruthers, 2006). 
Modularity is the orthodox EP view where the mind consists of a myriad specialized 
units carrying out operations and sub-operations related to perception, emotion, motor 
control, reasoning, learning, etc., and these units may not share information with one 
another. While there have been some suggestions for development in this regard 
(Bolhuis et al., 2011), in the context of this paper is does not matter exactly to what 
degree the mind is modular. It is enough that the mind is evolved, and that the activity 
of modules is not mutually transparent across the mind (Kurzban, 2010, pp.57–68). 
This means that we are not conscious of the mechanisms by which our minds operate, 
and often the rationalizations we give for our behavior and opinions are generated after 
they have been acted out or on. The implications of this fragmented view of mind 
become relevant in the section on morality, especially with respect to self-interest. 
 
2.2.1 EP in CDA: explanations, evidence, and implications 
Hart (2013) presents a theoretical example of a possible convergence between CDA 
and EP. Evolutionary psychologists hypothesized and then tested the idea that 
evolutionary pressures in ancestral times have shaped into human cognition a 
mechanism which specializes in tracking social contracts. A social contract specifies 
some requirement one must satisfy if one is to accept a benefit from someone else. 
The mechanism’s purpose, then, is to track how people follow such contracts, and to 
predispose individuals to punish “cheaters,” who are free-riders that collect the 
benefits of social practices without satisfying the requirements (Cosmides, 1989, 
p.196). A modern example could be people who collect welfare and are not attempting 
to get employed. This cheater detection mechanism was postulated to have evolved 
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because selection pressures for cooperation have been continually high, and 
indiscriminate altruism should be a design feature that would be out-competed by 
exploitative strategies (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p.164). 
The main line of evidence for this mechanism’s existence comes from a paradigm 
employing the Wason selection task. In this task, subjects are given a rule and asked, 
based on logical inference, in which of the given cases the rule has been broken. The 
results showed that when the content of the rule represents social contracts as opposed 
to something else (for example letters and numbers, and other familiar situations) 
people’s performance, i.e. correct answers, jumps from roughly 25% to 75% (see 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; 2005; 2007; Cosmides, Barrett & Tooby, 2010 for 
discussion). Hart (2013), then, focused on representations of immigrants as free-riders 
in the media, suggesting that activating the cheater detection module by this means 
may affect people’s attitudes towards them. 
In addition to providing explanatory potential, EP theories may also alleviate the 
possible complications caused by the politicization of CDA. Ultimately, how language 
use and human behavior relate to one another is an empirical question, and adopting a 
political (or indeed any) bias as the foundation of research is unscientific. Why should 
CDA be an exception (Chilton, 2005, p.21)? O’Halloran (2005, p.1946) claims that 
CD analysts tend to be “left-liberal,” which can affect the objectivity of analyses in at 
least two ways. First, those (potentially harmful) discourses that confirm the analyst’s 
bias may not receive critical attention because the political goals are shared. There is, 
then, no motivation to expose the ideological motivations behind them. This could 
lead to a situation where most critical work focuses on right-oriented discourses. A 
second issue is that analyses themselves could become biased if analysts “[hunt] for 
ideological structures” (Matheson 2005, p. 19) and see them even in places where none 
exist.  A final irony is that the political undertakings of CDA may be or become 
“’naturalized’, and hence be seen to be commonsensical and based in the nature of 
things or people, rather than in the interests of classes or other groupings” (Fairclough, 
2013, p.35)–the very thing CDA is attempting to expose in the first place. This is 
especially relevant if CDA cannot justify its central values (Chilton, 2011, p.799). 
Insofar as it is feasible to use EP theories to make predictions about language use, 
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those predictions are likely to be more resilient to biased interpretations because they 
have to be tightly anchored to our understanding of evolutionary forces. 
Despite the explanatory and political impediments, it is possible to empirically 
demonstrate language effects (at least in restricted settings) that could enable us to 
speculate that these effects translate to social effects. One finding relevant to my work 
is that lexical manipulations between the terms fetus and child can affect people’s 
attitudes towards abortion (Mikołajczak & Bilewicz, 2015). This set of studies first 
gave people surveys designed by the experimenters concerning the fetus’s/child’s 
development, and then their stances on abortion were interrogated. It was found that 
“those presented with the term foetus were more allowing of the abortion for non-
medical or non-legal reasons than those presented with the term child” (ibid., p.505), 
and one of their other studies indicated that this was because people attributed more 
humanness to child. This is just the type of evidence that would be required in CDA 
to make worthwhile claims about social effects. As Saurette & Gordon (2013, p.179) 
note: 
 
…it is crucial for practitioners of discourse analysis to clearly identify 
what their studies can demonstrate (i.e. which techniques a given 
discourse uses to persuade its audience) and what they cannot (i.e. the 
motivations or “true beliefs” that guide the speakers of that discourse). 
We can, of course, develop hypotheses about the individual motivations 
or beliefs of political actors from discourse analysis. But to truly 
investigate those elements rigorously, we require a variety of other 
methodologies as well. 
 
Research such as Mikołajczak & Bilewicz’s (2015) could indicate two things: that 
writers consciously attempt to use lexical choices as a means of persuasion, or that 
they are exhibiting their honest perception of the world. Given the selection of 
newspapers I will be looking at, persuasive efforts may appear to be a curious 
explanation for the language use in their comment sections because these papers could 
attract a reasonably (politically) homogenous readership. This is why I will also take 
into account the function of morality as a coalitional signaling mechanism, mainly for 
people’s political orientations or social opinions. 
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For the above reasons I will direct most of my focus on making hypotheses based on 
the knowledge available on human moral cognition. My purpose is not to make claims 
about the social effects of language because they are difficult to get a grip on, and I 
will not adopt a political stance because it may interfere with the objectivity of the 
analysis. However, CDA is an appropriate framework since in my view social change 
is consequential; not necessarily with respect to people’s political views, but to the 
quality of arguments and discussion that is had about the topic of abortion. 
 
2.3. Morality 
2.3.1. What is morality? 
As discussed, in the CD analytic tradition discourse is seen as a central factor creating 
social inequalities in society: groups holding different ideological beliefs struggle to 
gather and maintain social influence through language use in order to create power 
imbalances that serve the naturalization of their discourse. In the abortion debate (and 
also in general) it is worth paying attention to the question of why people fight for such 
power in the first place. There are certainly many situations where people can profit 
economically by persuading masses of people, such as in the case of advertising. 
However, it is not obvious how banning abortion is in the best interests of those who 
want to ban it–unless those people are planning to run the black market for abortion 
once they get their will and the procedure is outlawed. Why is abortion a moral issue 
in the first place? 
There are two ways to think about morality. The first one is the philosophical practice 
of asking questions about the meaning of words like right or wrong, and what it is that 
constitutes goodness and why people should be striving for such a thing (Driver, 
2007). The second one is the primary focus of this paper: it is the tendency of people 
to judge something as right or wrong, form (political) coalitions around shared moral 
beliefs, and exert social power in order to modify the behavior of others who are 
perceived as transgressors or non-invested third parties (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). 
It is the evolutionary account of why human cognition was adapted to perceiving 
perpetrators and victims, being motivated to involve oneself in the conflicts of others, 
and signaling one’s moral beliefs to them through language use and punishment 
(violence, shaming, ostracizing, and so on). From here on out, for the purpose of 
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clarity, I will use morality to refer to the propensity to condemn (etc.), and ethics to 
refer to the philosophical pursuit of seeking real truth into matters about right and 
wrong, insofar it is possible. 
While morality as construed above is the main concern in this paper, it is first 
necessary to define some key concepts in the ethical framework I adapt here. 
Otherwise it would be impossible for me to discuss specific arguments for and against 
abortion, and much less any societal ramifications they may have–which is relevant to 
CDA. 
One way that ethics can be thought of is deontology, which standardly focuses on rules 
about actions (Alexander & Moore, 2016). This means that a certain action can be 
wrong even if it brings about good effects, and conversely an action can be right even 
if it causes needless suffering. In contrast to deontology, consequentialism is the view 
that the rightness or wrongness of an action should be judged based on the 
consequences it brings about. In this framework, the consequences are standardly 
measured as anything that increases the conscious experience of well-being, or 
happiness (such as in utilitarianism): “acts are right just because they maximize the 
overall amount of well-being in the world” (Shafer-Landau, 2102, p.120). 
However, it can be argued that concerns of happiness and adhering to rules are mere 
matters of opinion. If someone does not mind continuously lying to others, who is to 
determine that he is doing anything bad? Ethical realism is the position which states 
that it is possible to be right or wrong about ethical claims, in the same way as it is 
possible to be right or wrong about any other factual claims. This means that ethical 
truths are not subject to varying opinions. For example, torturing somebody can be 
said to be objectively wrong even if the torturer in question sees nothing condemnable 
in his actions. One (and conceivably the only) way to establish ethical truth is to link 
it to a property which is intrinsically valuable and in principle measurable: well-being 
(see e.g. Harris, 2010, pp.28–37). This may allow us to get past some differences of 
opinion, for if it can be empirically demonstrated that following some precept leads to 
mass happiness with no foreseeable downsides, it cannot be objected that such a 
scenario is only one’s subjective belief. Of course, discussions about ethics are 
everything but simple and uncontested. But as this is not a work of philosophy, the 
previous short summary will have to suffice. 
11 
 
 
Quite distinct from philosophical pursuits is morality as a biologically grounded 
phenomenon. In whatever way nature endowed us with the capacity to moralize, there 
is no reason to expect that our moral intuitions lead to happiness for everyone; they 
need only assist us in survival and reproduction. Therefore in order to posit moral 
cognition as an evolutionary adaptation, there must be a fitness1 benefit to its 
development. My framework is largely based on DeScioli & Kurzban’s (2013) 
proposition that morality should be viewed as a coordination mechanism: when people 
can agree and signal condemnation with respect to moral principles before a violation 
occurs, this can reduce fitness costs stemming from 1) escalated (physical) conflicts 
where people choose sides and recruit defenders based on kinship, friendship, etc.; and 
2) the corruption of hierarchies where people side with the higher status individual. In 
the former case, costly physical conflicts may be likely because disputes are evenly 
matched and there is no obvious underdog who is likely to back out. In the latter case, 
the high-ranking individual can exert his power arbitrarily on others, which may lead 
lower-ranking parties to form an alliance and physically retaliate. When coordinated, 
however, moral precepts are impartial: they do not depend on the identity of the 
transgressor or victim (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p.220). Therefore the transgressor 
is unlikely to initiate conflict because he is outnumbered by the community (and may 
be unlikely to break moral rules in the first place due to conscience: see DeScioli & 
Kurzban, 2009, p.290). Treating morality as a coordination mechanism puts 
constraints and expectations on how human moral cognition should function. These 
guide the analysis of my data, and are explained below. 
 
2.3.2. Moral cognition: actions, victims, perpetrators, disgust, and self-interest 
A central feature of moral condemnation–judging something to be wrong–is the fact 
that it is not solely directed towards welfare consequences, but also significantly 
towards actions (see DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009, pp.292–3; 2016, pp.772–4 for 
review). For instance, the so called trolley problem has been used to examine people’s 
moral intuitions. In the experiment, subjects are asked whether it is permissible to 
                                                    
 
1 The concept of fitness has been defined in various ways, some more mistaken and confusing than 
others (Dawkins, 1989, pp.181–194). Since details of biology are not relevant to this work, it suffices 
to regard fitness (rather imprecisely) as reproductive success. 
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divert the course of a trolley which is about to run over five people onto another track 
on which it will only kill one. In this version, almost everyone (90%) judges it 
permissible to divert. However, 90% of people judge it as morally wrong to push a 
man off a bridge stopping the trolley on its way to kill five people, even though doing 
so would be a welfare gain, just like in the previous version of the problem. This makes 
sense given the idea that coordination requires it to be guided by a shared 
representation of a behavior, and is not therefore only aimed at reducing harm 
(DeScioli & Kurzban, 2016, p.779). 
Not only are actions often privileged in moral judgment, their commissions are seen 
as more immoral than omissions, even when the welfare outcomes are identical or 
worse (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009, pp.291). An interesting observation is that while 
people’s welfare estimates appear to track welfare consequences quite accurately, this 
is not the case for their moral evaluations. Therefore it is unlikely that moral rules act 
only as simplifying strategies in the service of ease of computation (ibid., p.289). With 
respect to the abortion debate, to be morally consistent, at least in the consequentialist 
fashion, would be to judge abortion2 to be as immoral as choosing not to have children. 
This is because in both cases the child-to-be is robbed of his potential life. However, 
if the human moral machinery is especially attuned to actions, this difference may not 
be wholly surprising: not having children is an omission, whereas having an abortion 
is an action. From a computational perspective, this makes sense: 
 
…everyone is always omitting to take an infinite number of actions. 
With few exceptions, attaining a meeting of the minds that one omission 
out of this amorphous set is uniquely immoral is far harder to cognitively 
arrange than is the joint identification of a mutually objectionable act of 
commission. (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p.225) 
 
                                                    
 
2  It is perfectly reasonable to argue that a baby not yet born in the final stages of pregnancy is a real 
victim because it is able to experience suffering. Yet abortion is very often seen as categorically wrong, 
including even the cases of some days old embryos. In this context, I am talking about only the clearest 
cases, sets of some hundreds or thousands of cells, where we know this organism cannot be hurt and 
therefore victimized. For comparison, consider that the brain of a fruit fly consists of about a hundred 
thousand neurons, which are, unlike an embryo, organized into a complex nervous system (Chiang et 
al., 2011). 
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It appears, then, that actions are more relevant for morality than their consequences 
and non-actions, which leads me to assume that this is likely to be reflected in language 
use: condemning abortion should be mainly expressed using action words. 
Much like actions, victims appear to be a fundamental part of morality (DeScioli & 
Kurzban, 2016, pp.778–779). Whenever wrongness judgments are made, people also 
appear to perceive victims almost invariably (DeScioli, Gilbert, & Kurzban, 2012). 
However, this is also the case for victimless offenses, suggesting that identifying 
victims may have a covert purpose beyond protecting others from harm: “Perhaps 
some victims [society, dead bodies] are not real people but are merely puppets used 
by condemners to further their strategic aims” (ibid., p.149). For the purposes of 
persuasion in the condemnation of abortion, it seems intuitive that embryos are not as 
impressive as victims as children are, and the same goes for abortion or termination 
as opposed to murder. The fact that moral argumentation is constrained by the 
plausibility of the justifications given for one’s position (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2014) 
could account for the argument about a child’s potential, since embryos are not 
children.3 Simply put, if an act harms an embryo or a fetus–especially if they are seen 
as non-human–it may be more difficult to justify that it is wrong compared to if it 
harms an actual child. Furthermore, to appear concerned about the object of abortion 
is a way to signal that one is not motivated by reasons of self-interest, but rather by 
the victimization of others–and given the modular organization of the mind, people 
may honestly believe this about themselves (but see Kurzban, 2010, p.194). The same 
works the other way around as well, where those who want abortion to be legal may 
argue using laudable concepts like “women’s equality and rights” (Bourgeois, 2013, 
p.30) instead of simply acknowledging that it is very convenient to be able to terminate 
an unwanted pregnancy safely and without fear of punishment. 
In order to dole out punishment in favor of the victim, the mind must represent a 
perpetrator as well (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2016, p.778), and sometimes these 
representations correspond to groups (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p.206). This happens 
                                                    
 
3 It is sometimes suggested that human life begins at conception, and therefore even embryos can 
technically be considered children. However, assigning human status is irrelevant to the reality of 
possible suffering: whether or not embryos can feel pain does not depend on us calling them children. 
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especially in political issues, since political affiliation is predictive of convergence of 
actions and attitudes within the group. Hence, the perpetrators in abortion issues may 
not always be only the women who undergo the procedure, but whole groups of people 
who support its legality, such as Democrats or liberals (even while there is, obviously, 
disagreement within these groups). The group itself may then be seen as an agent as 
the result of a categorization process: when enough people are similar in a group with 
respect to some property, that property may stereotypically be assigned to everyone 
based on group membership (Pinker, 1997, pp.308–10). 
There is also some reason to believe that people might employ disgust elicitation as a 
means of moral persuasion. The emotion of disgust evolved for the purpose of 
pathogen avoidance, which can be looked at from two perspectives. First, we recoil 
from rotten foods, body products, etc. which carry the risk of being infected by 
disease-causing microorganisms (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000, p.640–1). This 
could be taken to suggest that the purpose of disgust is to prevent us from ingesting 
harmful substances. But a second parallel idea (and not necessarily a fully compatible 
one: see Rottman, 2014) is that disgust originally evolved to avoid specific people, 
and not so much disease-ridden materials (Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003, pp.67–9; 
Schaller & Park, 2011, pp.99–100). For example, the physical appearance and 
behaviors (e.g. sneezing and having abscesses, sores, open wounds, etc.) of others may 
act as a cue signaling the risk of infectious disease. 
Tybur et al. (2013) suggest that the function of disgust as a mechanism for pathogen 
aversion may have been co-opted for the purpose of morality to signal judgment and 
coordinate action. Disgust can be implicated in moral judgment in at least two ways: 
actions that do not pose a threat of pathogen transmission may elicit disgust and be 
moralized (ibid., pp.73–74), and on the other hand, there is evidence that eliciting 
disgust is linked to increased moral condemnation (see also DeScioli & Kurzban, 
2016, p.783). For example, being exposed to a bad smell can induce people to more 
heavily condemn consensual sex between first cousins (amongst other things: see 
Schnall, Haidt, & Jordan, 2008). Moreover, disgust sensitivity appears to predict 
condemnation in at least some domains, such as homosexuality (Inbar et al., 2009), 
and it is also associated with more conservative attitudes towards abortion (Inbar et 
al., 2008). Therefore, whereas people might describe abortion as disgusting, 
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persuasive efforts are more likely to be more successful when the procedure is 
described graphically in an attempt to elicit a disgust response (though this could be 
more effective when done visually). If disgust is a crucial part of moral cognition, 
signaling condemnation of abortion should manifest as vocabulary like disgusting and 
its loose synonyms (e.g. repulsive), and attempting to change the minds of moral 
opponents or third parties should highlight the gruesome details of the procedure. If 
people implicitly appreciate that the audience of the comments they leave is likely to 
politically agree, the former should be more prevalent than the latter. However the link 
between disgust and morality is not totally clear. For instance, the causal evidence 
available has not clearly demonstrated the domain-specificity of disgust with respect 
to moral judgment (Pizarro et al., 2011). Therefore the focus I put on disgust is more 
observational than predictive. 
Moral condemnation does not only carry out the function of coordinating punishment. 
It also enables coordination before conflicts; it is a signaling mechanism. Expressing 
condemnation linguistically–as opposed to, for example, physically punishing 
someone–is a relatively uncostly signal to send others in an attempt to recruit 
collaborators. This is because physical punishment carries a higher risk of physical 
retaliation and condemnation from others–and in modern times, given a serious 
enough attack, the state may interfere and place the punisher in prison. On the other 
hand, posting condemnatory messages online is quicker, safer, and legal. 
Because alliances are powerful (especially in an ancestral environment), we are 
motivated to form them around shared moral beliefs (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, 
pp.207–208). Crucially, political action and attitudes appear to be a notably strong 
force in alliance formation, and the mere expression of political opinions can act as a 
probabilistic cue that predicts cooperation and coordination should a conflict arise 
(Pietraszewski et al., 2015, p.29). In this light, some (or much) of condemnation should 
be repetitive and devoid of argumentative quality, since one need not attempt to 
persuade someone whose interests and opinions are already in line with theirs. It could 
also be that the intensity of condemnation is linked to its credibility: someone who is 
rather indifferent about abortion and talks accordingly is not expected nor likely to 
involve himself in the conflicts of others due to potential social costs. But someone 
who aggressively demonizes transgressors and then backs out stands to lose face and 
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suffer the consequences–for example as a politician who promises one thing and does 
another after gaining power. In fact, there is evidence using the forementioned Wason 
selection task that people are good at detecting traitors who betray the commitments 
of the coalition (Sivan et al., 2018). Moreover, demonization and other forms of harsh 
condemnation are unlikely to persuade the opposing side because they are inherently 
antagonizing and may incite anger (see p.19). Therefore, because the newspapers I 
focus on are conservative and the readership is expected to politically align, 
commenting can be expected to be homogenous. For a signaling purpose it is enough 
that one only expresses his views with no persuasive efforts. 
Finally, for the purposes of connecting the social implications of the way moral 
cognition is organized to CDA, the role of self-interest needs to be discussed. The 
mere logic of evolutionary selection hints at the possibility that people should be 
motivated to strategically enforce rules that are in their best interests, and oppose those 
that interfere with them (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010, p.218). Weeden & Kurzban (2014, 
pp.75–85) suggest that because a high-commitment monogamous life-history predicts 
negative attitudes towards abortion, banning the procedure can be a way to inflict costs 
on others with more relaxed mating strategies. Conversely, of course, whoever opts 
for a more promiscuous lifestyle will benefit from having the least possible costs to 
the consequences of his actions. Simply put, promiscuous moral precepts are 
(biologically) threatening to those betting on a single relationship, and moral rules that 
judge and punish promiscuity are costly to promiscuous people. The logic of this idea 
is so well put by McCullough et al. (2012, p.563) that I will quote them at length: 
 
For men in particular, the high fidelity/parental investment strategy is 
undermined by men and women who pursue promiscuous sexual 
strategies because of the attendant reduction in paternity certainty, which 
raises the fitness-reducing prospect that faithful males are allocating 
parental investment to children who are not their offspring. For women, 
a high fidelity/parental investment strategy is undermined by men and 
women who pursue promiscuous sexual strategies because of the 
attendant increase in the risk that men will abandon their mates and 
withdraw parenting effort from their offspring with those mates. 
Therefore, natural selection likely favored the evolution of a mating 
psychology that causes people to enact social behaviors that put them in 
contact with individuals who are pursuing similar sexual strategies—as 
well as a psychology that motivates them to punish or ostracize 
individuals in their midst who appear to be pursuing rival strategies. 
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Therefore, what could motivate some anti-abortion arguments is not so much that 
abortion is really wrong, but other people’s sexual behavior. 
The previous explains why there is a tension between intuitive ethical realism and self-
interest. This is why we use discursive means–amongst others, like violence–to try to 
persuade others of the rightness of our moral views. But our arguments are not 
persuasive if we are perceived to be motivated by pure self-interest, not least because 
others may or may not jump on board for their own self-interested reasons (Kurzban, 
2010, pp.214–6). Indeed, there is evidence that people rather egregiously modify their 
moral views if such modifications yield them more benefits, but importantly the 
justifications they give for their behavior are limited by plausibility constraints 
(DeScioli et al., 2014). Moreover, in a luck-based economic game, winners were more 
likely than losers to judge the outcome of the game as fair when the starting position 
was unequal and worked in their favor (Molina, Bucca, & Macy, 2019). However, if 
the purpose of morality is to coordinate action, it cannot be based on pure self-interest 
since said interests are virtually never perfectly aligned, and others will not agree to 
following rules that put them at an unfair disadvantage. Therefore coordinating action 
requires that moral rules be viewed as universal and invulnerable to personal opinion 
(DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013, p.486). This would also mean that even if self-interest 
largely explains the condemnation of some actions, the justifications given should 
reference victims other than self–though in order to be plausible they should also be, 
at least superficially, connected to some commonly shared moral precept. Rules 
against murder, theft, etc., are good candidates for universality because everyone can 
be murdered or stolen from and therefore everyone can benefit if such rules are upheld 
(ibid., p.488). Disagreements arise when the interests of different groups are in 
seemingly stark contrast, for example with respect to wealth distribution. Self-
interested political action veiled by justifications such as fundamental freedoms or 
condemning the murdering of babies is further discussed in Section 5.2. 
 
2.4. Previous research 
Previous research on abortion discourse has focused on argumentation and ideology, 
women’s experiences, and the political and social issues around the debate. Saurette 
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& Gordon (2013) found that in the anti-abortion discourse in Canada (e.g. by 
politicians and organizations) argumentation that focuses on abortion causing harm to 
women is characterized by a larger word-count than “fetal personhood” arguments. 
Harms to women mean physical or mental complications, such as depression, being 
caused by having an abortion. Fetal-centric arguments highlight the status of the fetus 
as a person, where abortion is seen as a direct violation of its rights. Saurette & Gordon 
(2013, pp.172–4) interpret the larger word-count indicating more “weight,” meaning 
emphasis and persuasive effects. However, this may also be a consequence of how the 
human moral cognition is organized. If people are rule-oriented “Kantian” reasoners 
(DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013, p.479) who require action and victim cues to guide their 
moral judgments, it may not be surprising that more efforts are put into 
consequentialist arguments about the potential harms of abortion to women.4 These 
arguments may simply be less intuitive and therefore more difficult to justify than 
pointing to the fetus as a victim of the act of abortion. As noted earlier, it is essential 
that moral judgments enable people to coordinate action in punishing perpetrators in 
favor of the victim. The “abortion-harms-women” arguments are, then, further 
complicated by the fact that in them the woman is both victim and perpetrator (see 
also ibid., 2013, pp.285–6). 
Reflecting the idea that moral opinions often precede or are disconnected from their 
justifications, Dillon (1993) studied the discourse of pro-choice and pro-life groups in 
the US and concluded that “[t]he abortion debate…is a highly emotional one and 
involves a clash between disparate worldviews” (p.312). Given the complex nature of 
the ethics of abortion, this may be a surprising finding. But if self-interest motivates 
moral reasoning, and we are often unaware of why our moral views are what they are 
(wrong things just feel wrong and therefore they are wrong: see Haidt, 2001), it could 
be expected that argumentation surrounding abortion rights is less than sophisticated. 
The function of morality as a signaling mechanism contributes to this as well: if one’s 
purpose is to simply broadcast moral attitudes to others, they need not be justified. It 
would also be expected that if self-interest is a significant factor, we should be resistant 
                                                    
 
4 For instance, rules such as do not kill, steal or lie feel more familiar than do not cause physical 
suffering, distress related to loss, or emotional discomfort originating from betrayal–perhaps because 
it is easier to construct a shared representation of the former. 
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to acknowledging and much less adopting opposing views. Indeed, the emotion of 
anger evolved specifically to modify the behavior of those who do not appear to 
sufficiently value our welfare, and it predisposes us to inflict costs to, or withhold 
benefits, from them (Cosmides & Tooby, 2008, p.131–2). If access to abortion is 
relevant to one’s welfare, others’ attempts to restrict said access could incite anger 
(and vice versa). Demonizing one’s antagonists may then be adopted as a strategy in 
attempting to impose social costs on them. This may lead to further retaliation, creating 
a feedback loop which manifests as a highly emotional debate where opposing sides 
are not responsive to argumentation. 
Limitations on abortion rights indeed appear to be experienced as highly threatening. 
Sharma et al. (2017) report, in a study of over 700,000 tweets, that among the top 
hashtags in “For Abortion” messages is #waronwomen.5 Moreover, anger words were 
more common in the pro-abortion ideological category than any other. In line with my 
framework, anti-abortion tweets focused on “fetal personhood and abortion as an act 
of violence against the life of [the] fetus” (ibid., p.21), whereas pro-abortion tweets 
highlighted women’s rights and choice. Unsurprisingly, anti-abortion tweets also 
invoked religious precepts (and religiosity, too, is predicted by and relates to people’s 
reproductive strategies: see Li et al., 2010; McCullough et al., 2012; Weeden & 
Kurzban, 2013). 
Consonant with how alarming restrictions on abortion rights are seen as is the 
observation that women may often express relief after the termination of a pregnancy 
(Kirkman et al., 2011, p.124). Interestingly, women can also feel guilty about their 
relief, and this might be connected to how the object of abortion is conceptualized (see 
also Khan & Shah, 2016, pp.10–15). These conceptualizations range all the way from 
“just cells” to “child” (Kirkman et al., 2011, p.125). Whereas the lexical item child is 
often invoked in arguing against abortion, it can also be used as a justification for 
abortion in a very similar fashion: abortion may rob the future child of its life, but it 
can also save the future child from a life of disadvantage and difficulty if the parents, 
for whatever reason, are unfit to care for their offspring. There is no doubt that these 
                                                    
 
5 Note that the hashtag does not reference a war on rights, even though #rights and #reprorights were 
also common. This might be because women better fit the victim slot in the mind and are more 
impressive as such. 
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kinds of justifications are often legitimate, but it should also be recognized how they 
can be used to mask self-interest. It can be explicitly recognized and even given as a 
reason for abortion that having children can derange one’s life, but in order to shift 
focus from this inconvenience it might be highlighted that one is also–or only–
motivated by the future child’s welfare. 
The idea that women have abortions for self-interested reasons is not mere cynical 
speculation. Wiebe et al. (2005) studied “antichoice” (p.248) women’s reasons for and 
views on abortion. Women were considered antichoice if they would not allow others 
to have an abortion in all cases ranging from social reasons to rape and health risks. 
As this is quite a broad definition, the women were further interviewed in order to gain 
better insight into their attitudes. It was discovered that women allow abortions in their 
own circumstances, but not others’ (see also Beynon-Jones, 2017, pp.226–7). For 
instance, “not being ready” may be seen as a better reason for abortion than not 
wanting more children, or if a birth defect is likely (Wiebe et al., 2005, p.249). 
Sometimes the reasons for and against may even overlap. For example, one woman 
gave having “no money” (ibid.) as one of the reasons for her abortion, yet said that not 
being able to afford a child is not a good reason for abortion. This seems perfectly in 
line with one of the consequences of the modular mind: an act can be seen as wrong 
and yet committed, followed by some rationalization for why the moral precept does 
not apply in one’s own case. Some part of the mind wants to enforce a moral rule, 
another wants to break it, and a third is left with the job of justifying the contradiction 
(Kurzban, 2010, pp.59–62). Importantly, Wiebe et al. (p.250, emphasis added) note 
that  
 
[a]s these women who held antichoice views had all undergone abortions 
themselves, it is obvious not only that one person cannot make that 
choice for another, but also that no woman can make that choice for 
herself until she is facing an  unwanted pregnancy. 
 
In this case, shifts in attitudes appear to be motivated by self-interest, not ethical 
commitments. 
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Although women’s experiences with abortion have been studied, their lack in pro-life 
and conservative discourse surrounding the issue can be seen as a problem having 
political implications. O’Rourke (2016, p.42) points out in an analysis of political 
abortion discourse in Australia that “[w]hat is excluded in these debates is the 
subjects/agents voice of the women seeking abortion.” Some conservative politicians 
were then free to depict these women as irresponsible, promiscuous, and acting out of 
convenience. As expected, it appears that the discourse was also characterized by 
vocabulary such as killing and baby. Similarly, pro-life efforts in Canada describe the 
object of abortion as a child, and where fetus and embryo are used, it is suggested that 
they be included in the definition of human (Bourgeois, 2013, p.25). 
Bourgeois (2013), too, reaches the conclusion that the absence of women’s 
perspectives contributes to their marginalization–though in the next moment she notes 
that “[t]here is no mention of the male role within reproduction, pregnancy, or 
abortion” (p.29). Indeed, as Sharma et al. (2017, pp.6–7) discovered, the woman’s 
right to choose is a main focus in pro-abortion discourse (at least on twitter), whereas 
men’s involvement does not receive attention. The same is also highlighted by 
Bourgeois (2013, p.30): “no one should have the power to control how or when women 
make choices about their bodies.”6 Does this type of discourse marginalize men by 
undermining their role in pregnancy and their ability to affect the decision about 
abortion? One might believe that the male perspective is (prominently) pro-life and 
therefore, obviously, present in pro-life discourse, but this is not true: sex alone 
generally does not predict attitudes towards abortion. In other words, men are as likely 
to support the legality of abortion as women are (EKOS Research Associates, 2010; 
Pew Research Center, 2017; 2018b). 
 
                                                    
 
6 Choice sometimes acts as a curious justification (it is simply stating the fact that women can make the 
choice to have an abortion), and other times it is something that need not be justified at all, perhaps 
reflecting that abortion is not seen as a moral issue in the first place. Insofar as “substantial” (Bourgeois, 
2013, p.23) access to abortion involves using tax funds–as is the case in Canada–it seems perfectly 
reasonable to insist that such spending is well justified. This is why Bourgeois’ claim is missing a piece: 
abortion is not only about women’s choices and bodies when other people are involved in financing 
their procedures. 
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2.5. Summary 
I have assumed a straightforward connection from how we perceive and interpret the 
world to language as a means of communicating our beliefs and attitudes. But we do 
not speak only for the sake of exchanging ideas. The purpose of moral condemnation 
is to send a signal about who one is likely to align with in a conflict, coordinate 
punishment in favor of the victim, and attempt to enforce moral rules which are 
beneficial to oneself. While any evolutionary adaptation has to develop due to the 
fitness consequences it brings about (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009, p.288), this does not 
mean that the mind should be able to represent them. The consequences of an action 
can be impossible to track to their finality because they pan out indefinitely. For the 
same reason, it is also difficult to build shared representations of consequences. This 
could be one reason for why we rely on action cues–which are easily observed–in 
making moral judgments. For instance, if sexual infidelity is condemned and punished 
in the community, this can lead to more paternal certainty and deliver a fitness benefit–
even if the consequences of infidelity are not always detrimental (Trivers, 1972; Buss, 
2000, pp.52–53). Observed actions, then, can act as useful heuristics that when reacted 
to lead to good enough fitness outcomes (Johansson, 2005, p.17). This insight could 
be used to predict that moral transgressions are more often described in terms of 
unambiguous actions rather than welfare outcomes or through adjectives. 
Since victimhood appears to be closely associated with moral judgment, people are 
expected to point to victims–even non-existing ones–affected by transgressors. And to 
make their case more impactful, the status of the victims may be strategically elevated 
(in this case by humanizing them, e.g. embryo vs. child). Victims can also be used to 
veil self-interested motivations. Agency as perpetrators may be given to whole groups 
of people instead of only those committing the act. Disgust can be expressed as a 
simple signal of condemnation, and its elicitation may be used as a means of moral 
persuasion. 
A more conventional CD analysis might point to discourse features that are common 
in conservative discourse on abortion, assume that these features have social effects, 
and conclude that such effects are detrimental. Bringing about social change with 
respect to any social issue requires that the issue in question is socially understood. 
Unless some understanding of human psychology is introduced, it should seem 
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mysterious why some people want to ban abortion, and why they keep resorting to the 
same linguistic tactics when they are unlikely to be persuasive. It is not enough to 
simply condemn some type of discourse as problematic and leave it at that. This is 
especially the case when the rightness of one’s own views is taken for granted, which 
is why I do not adopt a political stance in this paper. My analyzing conservative 
discourse should not be taken as an indicator that I am “pro-choice,” and my writing 
the previous phrase should not be taken as an indicator that I am “pro-life.” My 
purpose is to attempt to gain insight into how and why abortion is condemned. 
 
 
 
3. Material and method 
 
In this section I describe how the material was selected and then collected from 
conservative news sites. As I do not focus on all comments about abortion, I explain 
the criteria for including comments for analysis into a small corpus. Then, some 
methods used beyond observing simple frequencies are shortly discussed (e.g. 
correlations between words and word-types). 
 
3.1. Material 
The material I use is comments collected from various American conservative online 
news outlets. Each website’s commenting platform allows their readers to create a 
username under which they can post comments relating to any news or opinion 
articles. Users are also able to reply to each other’s contributions. The material, then, 
represents one type of computer-mediated communication which can have important 
differences compared to other registers such as face-to-face discussions (Ho, 2008). 
These are considered in Section 5.1. 
The online media outlets chosen for this study are Breitbart, The Daily Wire, The 
Washington Times, and The Western Journal. Each of them self-identifies as a 
conservative news site, but the political leanings of some of these outlets were also 
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checked from a Pew report (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 9) and from the online 
source Media Bias/Fact Check (Van Zandt, 2015-). These particular sites were 
selected from a larger set of conservative news outlets based on their activity: the more 
people that leave comments in articles, the easier it is to collect a sufficient amount of 
data. 
A total of 400 comments were collected to build a very specialized small corpus 
(Baker, 2006, p.26), as I am attempting to capture a highly specific type of discourse. 
First, from each newspaper, the 20 newest articles tagged in the website’s abortion 
category were selected. The Washington Times had no such category, but their site 
enables the user to perform a Google-search on their site with any keyword. The first 
20 articles that the search returned for the keyword abortion written in 2019 were 
selected. Then, each article from each site was numbered from 1 to 20. The random 
number generator at https://www.random.org/ was used to randomly choose 10 
articles from each paper. Opinion articles were included, because the genre is not 
likely to affect the style of condemnation in the comments relevant to this study. 
Second, in every article, comments were sorted based on date (from newest to oldest). 
The first 10 comments that described abortion in a negative fashion were chosen for 
analysis. Negativity is, admittedly, a concept always subject to differing 
interpretations, and therefore I also included any ambiguous cases (I will further 
discuss this in Section 5.1). These amounted to 9 and I decided to ignore them because 
there were so few, and because I did nonetheless include other comments that were 
clearly condemnatory but did not neatly fit the criterion of negative description. 
Subsequent comments in any article by the same user were also discarded. These 
amounted to 26. Also, articles discussing abortion rights at all stages of pregnancy 
were discarded, since my purpose was to focus on abortion as generally as possible. 
Therefore the inclusion of extreme cases could distort the commenting. 
If the article had 5-9 comments, they were collected and I balanced them out in 
subsequent articles. For example, if an article had 8 comments, I would include them 
and take 12 from the next so that the average per article is 10. If there were under 5 
they were discarded. If the first ten articles did not yield enough comments, the 
remaining ten were randomized and used to collect the remaining ones. This approach 
was sufficient for Breitbart and The Daily Wire. 
25 
 
 
For The Washington Times and The Western Journal, the method of collection was the 
same until the list of the first ten articles was exhausted. Due to these news outlets’ 
lower activity, all comments were collected from subsequent articles. If the additional 
articles still did not yield enough comments, the rest of them were collected in order 
from older articles. All selected articles are listed in Appendix B. 
I do not perceive the use of this material to be ethically problematic–though it may not 
be totally without its issues. Those people whose comments are picked certainly did 
not agree to be included in a research paper, and such consent is impossible to get in 
any case. However as a general matter, I believe that any type of public discourse 
whose purpose is to be public, and in this case, is intended to be open to commentary 
and further discussion, should be free for analysis. If I were to analyze anyone’s single 
comment and reply back to him, I would only be engaging in what these comment 
sections were designed for. Therefore analyzing these comments in a paper does not 
seem very much ethically distinct. Moreover, very few commenters used their real 
names (or rather, what might be someone’s real name). 
 
3.2. Method 
While there are CD analysts that advocate for attention to be directed somewhat 
systematically at specific language features or details (see e.g. Jäger, 2001, p.55; 
Huckin, 2002, pp.6–10), the conception of CDA I adapt is not a method in and of itself 
(van Dijk, 2015, p.466). This is because critical analyses can focus on a wide variety 
of issues, and specific problems may require specific theoretical insights (Wodak, 
2006, p.182). My particular approach, which is explained below, enables me to get a 
broad picture about how abortion and the actors involved in it are negatively 
represented in moral condemnation in the specific setting of online commenting on 
conservative websites. These representations, like “abortion is murder” or “democrats 
are baby murdering traitors,” do of course carry more meaning than their superficial 
content as mere truth-claims (see topos of threat: Wodak, 2001, p.75). For example, 
if abortion is represented as murder it may be implied that abortion ought to be 
outlawed, or if somebody is a baby murdering traitor it is implied that they ought to 
be punished. The connection of such representations to possible political implications 
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is further discussed in Section 5.2., because whatever language features are examined, 
the purpose of CDA is to discuss them with respect to social issues. 
A quantitative corpus method is the obvious choice, given that I have hypothesized 
patterns which should be prevalent in the sample. For each comment, the following 
information was gathered into an excel file for ease of quantitative analysis: 
1) Website on which the comment was left. 
2) Article headline. 
3) URL to article. 
4) Username (a for anonymous). 
5) Sex (0 for male, 1 for female, though due to its relatively low, ambiguous, 
and untrustworthy nature was mostly ignored in the analysis). 
6) Date. 
7) Number of upvotes/likes (ignored in the analysis). 
8) Number of arguments against abortion which refer to negative consequences 
(for example the woman’s regret). 
9) Number of words. 
10) Number of victims identified (e.g. slaughter vs. babyslaughter). 
11) Number of perpetrators identified. The perpetrator specified was enough to 
be implicated and not necessary the one having the abortion, e.g. “party of 
infanticide.” 
12) Number of descriptions of abortion that may elicit disgust (e.g. “ripped to 
pieces and turned into bloody slush”). There were not many, and due to the 
rather vague and subjective nature of such expressions I will not focus on 
them much. 
13) Number of expressions of disgust (e.g. sick, disgusting). 
14) Number of indications of the commenter’s view of what will or should 
happen to perceived perpetrators as punishment (e.g. jail, hell). 
15) Total number of condemnations i.e. negative representations (some 
commenters may use several linguistic means for describing abortion). 
In addition to the numerical values of 10–14, the actual linguistic expressions were 
gathered in separate files and the numbers of their occurrences were summed. Also, 
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the following counts of words used to describe abortion were listed (duplicates were 
ignored if they belonged to the same word class): 
a. Verbs (e.g. “woman’s right to kill their babies”) 
b. Adjectives (e.g. bad) 
c. Modifiers (e.g. “satanic killing of unborn children”) 
d. Nouns (e.g. “abortion is murder”) 
e. Action words (verbs and nouns such as butchering) 
f. Non-action words (adjectives and nouns such as sin) 
Each reference to abortion was also separately listed to compare their frequencies (e.g. 
murder vs. kill). Finally, I observed whether or not the above word types (a-f) were 
used at all in the comment, 1 for yes and 0 for no. For example, the cell value for verbs 
would be 1 even if there were 5 verbs. This was used in anticipation that the data may 
become distorted if some commenters express several condemnations (see Table 1 
below). 
 
Table 1. Balancing outliers. 
Looking at totals, the (made up and unrealistic) example on the left may lead one to believe that 
people more often opt for adjectives rather than verbs in condemning abortion. To balance out 
deviations in order to capture how people more typically condemn, the total on the right is calculated 
by how many people used verbs (6) vs. adjectives (1) in the same data set. 
 
 
The comments did not need to explicitly refer to abortion–indeed, very few did. For 
example, murdering children in a comment related to abortion can hardly mean 
anything else. Similarly, references to people who have had abortions or support 
abortion rights etc. were included. For instance, if such people are referred to as 
murderers, this logically entails that abortion is conceptualized as murder, which in 
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turn amounts to a negative description following the operationalization used in this 
study. Replies to comments were ignored as I did not want to include comments 
influenced by previous commenters (earlier comments could also do this, but the 
comments that others reply to are guaranteed to). 
My main hypothesis is that the condemnation of abortion would mostly be expressed 
in terms of actions. There are some cases where it is debatable whether or not the word 
in question actually refers to an action. Adjectives can be derived from verbs (e.g. 
murdering, murderous: Biber, Conrad, & Leech, 2002, p.191), and while they are 
descriptive words they do contain allusions to actions. Similarly, nominalization (ibid., 
pp.89–90) can be used to derive nouns from verbs, and often these nouns  denote 
people who perform specific actions (e.g. murderer). In order to come up with a 
reasonable definition for action words that does not attempt to accommodate as many 
items as possible, I treated these potentially ambiguous items as non-actions. The same 
was done to words like death: even if events such as this can be regarded as something 
happening, they can be passive and not necessarily involve a perpetrator. Also, causing 
death to others is already described as killing, murder, etc. 
By action words, then, I mean all verbs as well as nouns that denote specific types of 
events. Nouns, according to the traditional definition, identify “things” or the names 
of people and places (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002, p.29). But while nouns such as 
murder certainly refer to a thing, such words stand in clear distinction with other nouns 
like chair. First, the nouns I focus on are often derived from, or have corresponding, 
verbs. For instance, gerunds such as in “killing babies is not a winning issue!” were 
somewhat common and are nominalized from a verb by the attachment of a suffix. 
While this way of categorizing actions accounts for the vast majority of these lexical 
items in my data, it does not provide a satisfactory definition for words like infanticide. 
I therefore apply an additional semantic condition involving the roles of (human) 
agents (ibid., p.194) that perform actions and patients (ibid., p.53) who undergo them. 
Relevant to my purposes are words that require an agent doing something to a patient: 
there can be no infanticide or a killing that does not involve a perpetrator acting in a 
specific way in relation to a victim. To these items it also applies that actors are 
perceived as intending to reach goals (of victimization in this case) by their actions 
(Halliday, 2002, p.196). 
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Modifiers, or descriptions of perpetrators or victims (e.g. evil mother, innocent baby), 
were not separately listed as condemnations because my main focus is on the 
vocabulary concerning abortion. However, modifiers like murderous were treated as 
adjective-based condemnations: evil etc. can refer to anything the perpetrator does, but 
murderous is a straightforward reference to abortion. In other words, it suggests that 
abortion is analogous to murder, as in the case of using the word murderer to describe 
someone who has had an abortion or supports abortion rights. I also included victims 
and perpetrators in comments that discussed hypothetical situations because they 
reflect how people reason about moral issues. 
Lastly, items such as perform human sacrifice counted as nouns, since human 
sacrifice, which is a noun, can be substituted for abortion. However this is a minor 
issue since word classes are not as important here as action words vs. non-action ones. 
But sometimes what could be substituted were non-actions, and I treated them as such. 
This was done in the spirit that the definition for actions would not be too broad. 
Otherwise e.g. have/perform/commit/favor/etc. [non-action description of abortion] 
would count as action condemnations which would not accurately indicate how 
abortion itself is thought of. 
After tabling the results in Excel, logical functions were used to determine specific 
correlations. For example, the SUMIF function could be used to see if victims are 
more likely to be identified in comments which express condemnations in terms of 
actions as opposed to non-actions. In this case the values in the actions used (0/1) 
column can be added together conditional upon the cell value in the victim column 
being greater than zero. The function then yields the sum of comments where action 
words were used and which also identified victims. In addition, I used the free corpus 
tool AntConc by Laurence Anthony to perform simple word and collocation searches. 
For example, as my main focus was how people describe abortion, out of all adjectives 
I only tabled those that describe, or modify references to, the procedure. AntConc was 
then used later to examine modifiers of victim words as well to see if there are 
collocation patterns (Baker, 2006, p.95–96). 
Finally, I also pay some attention to the lexical diversity in the sample, which can be 
used to measure the variability of the vocabulary used in condemnation. I will look at 
the type-token ratio, which is calculated by dividing the number of different words by 
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the total number of words in the corpus (Johansson, 2008, p.62). However, because 
the type-token ratio becomes less useful due to the disproportionately increasing 
number of grammatical words in larger corpora (Baker, 2006, p.52), I will also simply 
observe how frequent specific action, victim, and perpetrator words are compared to 
others. These measures of lexical diversity can then be used to determine how 
homogenous or repetitive the condemnation of abortion is in the sample. 
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
Here I present the results of my analysis with respect to the hypotheses sketched in 
Section 2: (1) abortion is more likely to be described as an action as opposed to a non-
action, (2) victims are identified and likely humanized, and (3) perpetrators are 
identified and can be groups of people rather than those having or performing the 
abortion. Disgust and punishment were also observed: they are sometimes expressed 
and elicited in moral condemnation. In going through the results, and in all graphs, the 
lexical items presented are either the lemma (murder stands for murder/ed/ing etc.) or 
the actual referent of various expressions (Democrats includes demoncrats, party of 
death, etc.). In other words, the item shown stands for everything that refers to it, 
regardless of the exact form. I use underlining to highlight words in all examples. 
 
4.1. General characteristics of the corpus 
The corpus consists of 365 comments. Out of the original 400, 26 were discarded 
because they were left by commenters I had already included in the sample, and 9 
others were discarded because I classified them as ambiguous (examples 1 and 2 
below). 
(1) If you think abortion is good you’re a psychopath. 
(2) It is shameful that abortion proponents use the tragedy of rape and incest as 
the justification to keep abortion readily available for convenience and profit. 
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Comments like these were excluded because I wanted to have as clear a definition of 
negativity as possible. It does seem reasonable to assume that both of these comments 
are in fact condemnatory. However, to be exact, in (1) what is condemned is thinking 
that abortion is good, which does not necessarily amount to condemning abortion 
itself as morally objectionable. Similarly, in (2), abortion could be acceptable or 
morally neutral, but not for convenience and profit, and not using these particular 
justifications. 
The total number of words in the corpus is 17589, which makes the average length of 
a comment only 48 words. Other measurements further indicate that comment length 
is typically short in the sample. The median length is 30 words, 65% of comments had 
50 words or less, and 88% of comments had 100 words or less. The longest comment 
had 283 words. I of course selected only specific kinds of comments as data, but these 
observations are roughly in line with the general style of commenting: for instance, in 
Freund’s (2011, p.20) sample of comments left on a news website, 75% of them had 
102 words or less. The type-token ratio for the whole corpus was low at 0.18 (the value 
ranges from 0 to 1), but lexical diversity is examined below in more detail. Finally, 
male usernames were more frequent than female usernames (77 vs 16). 
 
4.2. Action and non-action 
Out of all 483 condemnations, 378 were action-based (78%). In order to balance out 
any comments that included several condemnations, I checked how many comments 
used at least one action item. Out of the eligible 365 comments, 301 did so (82%). 
Moreover, the proportion of condemnations that used only action words was 71%. 
Action words, then, were clearly the preferred strategy in expressing moral judgments, 
which is in line with what was expected based on my framework. The anticipation that 
condemnations of abortion would primarily be expressed in terms of action words as 
opposed to non-action words was based on the theory that morality enables us to 
coordinate behavior based on mutual representations of condemnable actions–
especially unambiguous ones (for instance, punching is more definite than hurting).  
Lexical diversity was low with respect to the action items used. The stems kill and 
murder were equally (133 vs. 134) common, together comprising 71% of all action 
words (kill was more common as a verb, and murder as a noun). This leaves the 
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occurrence of all other items miniscule: infanticide, slaughter, and genocide were the 
next most common stems comprising 4%, 3.4% and 2.4% of all, respectively (see 
Figure 1 below). As expected, this distribution somewhat differs from baseline data 
acquired from the Corpus of Contemporary American English, COCA (Davies, 2008-
: Figure 2).7 The differences seem to result quite straightforwardly from the specialized 
nature of my data: the higher occurrence of infanticide is not surprising if fetuses are 
seen as human entities, and the same applies to the higher occurrence of murder (this 
is further discussed in the next section on victims). 
Figure 1. Ten most common action items. 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequencies of the top five action items in COCA. 
 
                                                    
 
7 Searches for murder, kill, and slaughter were performed using the lemma and attaching the tags _v* 
and _nn* to include only verbs and nouns, e.g. murder*_v*. Then, non-actions such as murderer(s) and 
slaughterhouse(s), were subtracted from the number. I only used these five items because they are the 
most relevant, and due to the specialized nature of my corpus more meaningful comparisons would 
require context filtration (e.g. take would have over 600,000 instances and take a life only 121). 
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The most common action items used also appear to conform to the idea that 
condemnations may appeal to “Rawlsian” precepts (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013, 
p.488), which relate to prohibiting actions that everyone can be a victim of. This was 
because if the condemner manages to link (in this case) abortion with murder in the 
listeners’ minds, it could lead to increased condemnation or moral persuasion since 
murder is already very likely condemned. Of course, it is unclear and possibly quite 
unlikely that such strategies are effective, but this is irrelevant when commenters aim 
to only signal their views. In addition to murder, kill is also a Rawlsian violation in 
the above sense, but the large difference in frequency to e.g. slaughter also seems 
fairly explainable by the distribution in the general corpus. 
Nouns were more common than verbs, which appears to be best explained by the use 
of gerunds. For instance, murdering and killing were commonly used as nouns (see 
examples 3 and 4), though they are identical to the present participle forms of verbs. 
For one, given their appearance, these gerunds may be intuited as verbs. But what is 
more relevant is that these items refer to actions regardless of word class. 
(3) Murdering unborn babies is "reproductive health." Love is hate. War is peace. 
(4) For pro abortion liberals, an unborn child occupies about the same moral 
status as a stalk of celery. Killing an unborn child, for them, is about as 
significant as tossing a toothpick out your car window. 
Non-action words were somewhat rare: they comprised 20% of all condemnations, 
and 23% of comments used them at least once. 12% of comments used only non-action 
words. Nouns were slightly more prevalent than adjectives (57% vs. 43% of all non-
action items), but given the small sample of 96 non-action items it is difficult to say if 
there is a genuine difference. Action words were still slightly more common than non-
action words even if erasing the effect of kill and murder. 
Evil was the most common non-action item at 13 instances, sometimes used as a noun 
and sometimes as an adjective (examples 5 and 6). 
(5) Killing the unborn is depraved-indifference murder, but, as we know, it's an 
evil we condone… 
(6) Taking the life of an unborn child for the sake of your personal convenience 
is evil and selfish. 
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Interestingly, the next most common words were death, killer, murderer, and 
murderous. This shows that even though treated as non-actions, these items definitely 
contain allusions to actions (with the possible exception of death: see examples 7–10). 
This leaves “pure” non-action condemnations with an almost non-existent prevalence 
at 1%. The explicit condemnation wrong only occurred twice (example 11). 
(7) Next up, the musical comedy, "Death of a Baby." (In article B2 about 
Hollywood depicting abortions.) 
(8) Defund the baby killers 
(9) ANYONE who believes abortion of fetuses after hearing a heartbeat is JUST 
PLAIN SICK AND DISGUSTING AND IS A MURDERER, PLAIN AND 
SIMPLE!!! 
(10) Well done Governor and those that supported the bill. The tide is turning For 
"LIFE" Against the murderous demoncrats 
(11) Killing Innocent Babies is wrong. 
In summary, action words dominate descriptions of abortion.8 Adjectives were rare, 
and this is not explained by them being used as modifiers: for example, in “the horrible 
murder of babies,” horrible would not count as an adjective-based condemnation, but 
only as a modifier of an action condemnation. However only 8% of comments used 
such modifiers, and therefore the balance against noun/verb-based condemnations 
would not be significantly swayed even if they were treated as adjective-based. Action 
words, then, seem to be not only the intuitive means of condemnation but a sufficient 
one. 
 
4.3. Victims 
Victims were identified in 66% of all condemnations. Again, to correct for the effect 
of possible outliers, I examined how many comments identified at least one victim. 
The proportion was somewhat higher at 77% of all comments. These results are in line 
                                                    
 
8 One might note that the phrase “abortion/it is murder/ing” is a kind of meme that is repeated for the 
sake of repetition, and this could be distorting the sample. However the utterance occurs only 17 times 
in the corpus. Insofar that is a commonly adapted expression, it may also be worthwhile to think about 
why it has caught on as opposed to other possible phrases (e.g. “abortion is evil”). 
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with the observation that reasoning about moral judgment generally involves 
perceiving victims (DeScioli, Gilbert, & Kurzban, 2012). Moreover, since moral 
condemnation aims to coordinate action in favor of a victim, I anticipated that 
identifying them is crucial in linguistic signaling (though the actors involved in 
reasoning processes may not always be totally congruent with language use: see p.36 
below on murder and kill). In order to see if the perception of actions is associated 
with victim identification, I checked how many action vs. non-action condemnations 
involve victims. There turned out to be no glaring difference: 82% of action 
condemnations had victims, and for non-actions the proportion was 72%. This could 
be taken to suggest that identifying victims is necessary to justify wrongness 
judgments regardless of the manner of condemnation. 
As was the case for action vocabulary, the lexical diversity of victim items was also 
low (see Figure 3). Baby accounted for 50% of all victims and child for 17%. Human 
was the third most common at 8%. As expected, there were only a few (5) instances 
of fetus. Embryo did not occur at all. Victims were anticipated to be strategically 
elevated, in the case of abortion by means of humanization: victimizing an embryo is 
difficult, since they are not very developed. However if the notion of baby, for 
instance, is successfully stretched to accommodate embryos as well, it can be used in 
pointing to more plausible victims. Accordingly, the top three items, which constitute 
75% of all, were explicitly human.  
 
Figure 3. Ten most common victim items. 
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The potentially curious victim item black people is usually associated with the claim 
that abortion rights supporters and Planned Parenthood9 have racist motivations 
because a disproportionate number of abortions are had by African Americans 
(examples 12–14 below). 
(12) Every year, abortion mills slaughter over a million (mostly black) babies in 
the U.S. 
(13) Abortion is legalized ethnic cleansing facilitated by illegal government 
funding. The left’s racism has been disguised as healthcare to blacks and the 
poor and they bought into it hook, line and sinker. Dumb sheep. 
(14) The abortion industry and modern Democrat Party are doing what the old 
time Democrat Party and KKK would never have had the guts to do--
exterminate blacks on a wide-scale basis. 
A collocation analysis was performed with AntConc to see if the status of victims was 
further highlighted by the use of modifiers. Since baby and child comprised the 
majority of victim words, I checked which modifiers were most commonly used for 
them. The most common modifier was unborn at 33 instances (which is not necessarily 
an evaluative word), and the next common one was innocent at only 15 occurrences. 
A simple search for innocent yielded 31 hits, therefore modifying only 10% of victim 
items at most (because some innocents were victims and not only modifiers). Other 
empathic modifiers like vulnerable and helpless were only used once. Perhaps 
surprisingly, then, using descriptive words for victims in an attempt to create impact 
did not seem to be a common strategy–as was also the case for action words. 
Finally, it seems intuitive that some action concepts relate to condemnation more 
straightforwardly than others. As an example, it would be expected that murder, on its 
own without specifying victims, is likely to be more sufficient to signal condemnation 
as opposed to kill. This is because the concept of murder specifically refers to killing 
humans, but kill relates to any living being at all. The collocates of these words show 
this: the number of the top three victims used in the vicinity of kill were 130 as opposed 
to 71 for murder. This suggests that there is a disconnection between cognitive moral 
                                                    
 
9 Planned Parenthood is a partially government-funded reproductive health care organization that 
provides, amongst other things, abortion services. 
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templates and the manner in which people condemn, because victim (as well as 
perpetrator) identification can be to some degree dependent upon which words are 
used to condemn regardless of the moral offense (murder and purposefully killing a 
human are roughly semantically identical). The previous also explains in part the 
somewhat low victim identification rate for condemnations at 66%. Presumably, the 
rate would have been even lower if people had only used murder instead of kill due to 
the redundancy of pointing to a human victim. 
 
4.4. Perpetrators 
Perpetrators were identified in 43% of condemnations and 53% of comments 
identified at least one perpetrator. Following the same logic as with victims, moral 
transgressions were expected to invoke pointing to perpetrators in order to coordinate 
action, but the differences to the victim identification rates are notable. Consonant 
with victims, action vocabulary was not linked to increased identification: 54% of 
action condemnations involved perpetrators vs. 59% for non-action. 
Planned Parenthood (including its leaders, presidents, heads, etc.) comprised 21% of 
all perpetrators, followed by 10% for Democrats (examples 15–18). These top two 
items did not dominate the sample to quite the extent seen in the case of actions and 
victims, but still the lexical diversity appears rather low (see Figure 4 below). 
Figure 4. Ten most common perpetrator items. 
Ambiguous items (26 instances), such as they, were not included when it was unclear what or who they 
refer to. 
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(15) Keep it up Planned Murderhood. 
(16) Planned SlaughterHouse bemoans his birth ... One got away from us. 
(17) Liberals & demoncRATS are willing to murder innocent humans simply 
based on their location. Inside the womb = property to sell. Outside the womb 
= live baby unless you live in New York. 
(18) The Democratic Party has long been the party of abortion, the party of death. 
The relatively low number of perpetrators is surprising given that, in hindsight, I would 
have also expected that articles concerning the actions of Planned Parenthood, specific 
politicians, etc. could have predisposed the commenter to point to these agents. My 
results do not take this into account, but there appear to be some signs of a modest 
effect of this sort. I performed a word search (planned) in AntConc to see which 
articles had the most comments referring to Planned Parenthood. In the top five 
articles, there were 6, 3, 3, 2, and 2 mentions of the organization. The 1st, 4th, and 5th 
articles mentioned Planned Parenthood in the headline. 
If the effect is real, it means that perpetrators are, in a way, even rarer than they seem 
because the perpetrators would tend to appear in the comments of articles which have 
already specified them for commenters. This implies that people do not spontaneously 
point to perpetrators as often as would be anticipated based on my framework. It is 
somewhat difficult to account for this observation. One complication is that while the 
vast majority of victim items refer to the fetus, the perpetrators can range all the way 
from the doctor performing the abortion, the woman deciding to have one, the 
organization providing the service, or the party supporting the woman’s right to 
terminate the pregnancy. This suggests that unequivocal perpetrator identification can 
be difficult to achieve when the moral transgression is the result of a wide causal web 
of agents. 
Nonetheless, given the idea that “[m]oral representations include a perpetrator and a 
victim” (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013, p.485, emphasis original), I further examined the 
connection of these two. It turned out that 43% of all comments identified victims and 
perpetrators, and 53% of all comments that identified victims also identified 
perpetrators. However, 80% of all comments that identified perpetrators also identified 
victims, suggesting that victims are more closely connected to moral signaling. While 
it cannot be said that the roughly 50% identification rate for perpetrators is small per 
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se, moral condemnation appears to more strongly drive victim determination in my 
data. 
I observed in the previous section that the word used to condemn can affect victim 
identification because a victim is already included in the definition of the word 
murder. This means that perpetrators should not show an effect, and they do not. The 
lemmas murder and kill yield an equal number of perpetrators10 at 44 and 46 instances 
using the top four items Planned Parenthood, Democrats, illegal immigrants, and 
liberals. But just as intuitively, it seems that in order to determine that an action is 
wrong it is not required that one is able to point to a perpetrator. Therefore the lower 
rate of perpetrator identification can reflect that it is irrelevant for justifications to 
include them: abortion is judged to be wrong because it kills a human regardless of 
who does it. 
 
4.5. Disgust, punishment, consequences, and other minor observations 
In this sample, both disgust elicitation and expression were rare, and many of the 
elicitations were uttered by the same commenter. Elicitation and expression were 
found in only 2% and 4% of all comments, respectively, and due to their low 
occurrence cannot be meaningfully analyzed. According to my data, disgust appears 
to be somehow implicated in moral condemnation–but while it may be involved in 
moral reasoning, it does not commonly reach spontaneous verbal signaling. The 
disgust expression stems were sick, disgust, and repulse. Some examples of disgust 
elicitation are shown below (one commenter also included a link to a graphic 
illustration of abortion): 
(19) The same people who get all [torqued] out of shape (and rightly so) about an 
animal being mistreated, seem to have no problem with a baby being sliced 
apart alive by [a] razor sharp [curette] or ripped to pieces and turned into 
bloody slush by the tube of a vacuum pump inserted next to their desperately 
struggling body. 
                                                    
 
10 Because perpetrators may often be identified further away from the action word than victims, I used 
a wide range of 20L–20R in AntConc’s collocation search. The precise numbers for murder/kill are: 
Planned Parenthood 11/5, Democrats 18/17, illegal immigrants 7/4, and liberals 8/20. 
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(20) Pulling a baby out of the womb piece by piece is nothing but murder, no 
matter how you try to sugar coat it. 
What counts as disgust elicitation is of course difficult to define precisely, and how 
sensitive people are to disgust will vary. However due to there being very few 
instances of elicitation it will not be useful to try to iron this out any further. 
With respect to punishment, no commenters expressed their willingness to personally 
punish perpetrators. A total of only 21 commenters thought that there should or will 
be punishment, amounting to 6% of all comments. Some suggestions for punishment 
were jail (3) and charge with murder (3). Most of the rest invoked religious ideas like 
hell (6) and Judgment Day (4): see examples 21 and 22 below. Again, the lack of these 
items makes it difficult to say much about them beyond the fact that religiosity is 
associated with anti-abortion attitudes in general (Minkenberg, 2002; Hyne, 2015). 
(21) Murdering babies is genocide. He will burn in hell forever, so says the lord 
God. 
(22) any society that thinks that killing [its] most vulnerable people is the pinnacle 
of [its] progress, has clearly lost [its] ways and mind, and deserve no mercy 
on "judgment day" . 
There were 11 comments which condemned abortion by referring to negative 
consequences, though these comments also often utilized action vocabulary. 
Sometimes it is suggested that these consequences apply to the women having 
abortions (example 23), but they can also be thought of concerning the fetus or society 
itself (example 24). The scarcity of consequentialist condemnations makes sense given 
that actions are privileged as heuristics in making moral judgments, and because 
people are not expected to put significant effort into persuasive arguments when the 
audience is already likely to agree (see also p.45 on computer-mediated 
communication). 
(23) If a conscience ever surfaces, their greatest difficulty is accepting 
responsibility and finding a way to forgive (live with) themselves. They will 
never stop wondering who that individual baby would have become; 
especially if they subsequently have other children. 
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(24) The arguments against abortion are too numerous to state here, but in short 
these people defend a practice that is to the harm of not only the unborn child, 
but also to society and especially to the women they profess to be helping. 
There were also 5 other types of comments that were condemnatory but did not use 
the kind of means for condemnation that fit into my most salient categories. In other 
words, they may, for example, directly express an attitude without substituting 
abortion or equating it with negative expressions (example 25). 
(25) I hate abortion and would abhor the taxpayer paying for one no matter if a 
citizen or an alien. 
While I did not intend to focus on aspects unrelated to condemnation, I nonetheless 
happened to notice that in some cases the level of condemnation may be shifted 
depending on who were having the abortions. Comments in articles about illegal 
immigrants’ abortion rights often appeared to have a different tone: usually comments 
were almost uniformly condemnatory, but in the case of illegal immigrants some were 
in favor of abortion. I went back to article B9 (see Appendix B) which had comments 
such as the following: 
a) YES!!!! Abortion for illegals!!! I support this. Welcome to America! The price 
of your invasion is your children. 
b) Medical care - absolutely NOT! Abortions - absolutely yes. 
c) Abortion for Spanish Invaders? For once we agree. 
d) Actually, I agree with her. We need to put a [Planned Parenthood] clinic in 
every mosque. 
e) With this one I agree! 
These comments were found within the first 25, but because statements of this sort 
were not systematically analyzed I cannot claim that this is a genuine effect. However 
this could be a case where attitudes shift: babies’ lives might cease to be of importance 
if there is dislike towards specific kinds of babies. This may be connected to free-rider 
aversion. Insofar as illegal immigrants are seen as a group that on the whole drains 
national resources, providing tax-funded services to them could trigger the cheater 
detection module discussed in Section 2 (Hart, 2013). It is, of course, important to 
keep in mind that I cannot know what these particular commenters generally think 
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about abortion, and therefore cannot claim that they are inconsistent with respect to 
opposing it. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
This section recapitulates the main results and compares them to previous findings 
about abortion discourse. I also consider some crucial limitations, e.g. with respect to 
generalizability and how well the EP framework can be used to make predictions about 
the specifics of language use. Finally, as this is a CDA study, I deal with some social 
implications that may arise from an evolutionary understanding of our moral biases. 
 
5.1. Summary of results, relation to previous research, and limitations 
This paper set out to combine theoretical and empirical developments in evolutionary 
and moral psychology with a critical discourse analytic framework. Knowledge about 
the organization of human moral cognition was used to formulate ideas about what the 
condemnation of abortion should look like. Due to the political divide, the connection 
of conservatism and anti-abortion attitudes (Pew Research Center, 2017), and some 
previous general impressions, the comment sections of American conservative news 
outlets were chosen as the source of material. This study was situated in the larger 
framework of CDA because I believe that, as a social approach, the discipline can 
benefit from analyses being informed by an understanding of evolved human 
psychology. This will be discussed later in the section. 
Given the idea that human moral cognition implements a template that requires a 
wrong action committed against a victim by a perpetrator, I expected that spontaneous 
verbal condemnation would reflect this pattern. To a large extent–at least in the case 
of abortion in the comment sections of conservative news sites–it appears to. 
Condemnations were mostly expressed in terms of actions: 82% of all comments 
utilized action vocabulary. Abortion was usually conceptualized as an act of murder 
or killing, and it seems that these action items were almost sufficient across the board. 
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They comprised 71% of all action words, and actions were rarely (8% of the time) 
modified. Only 23% of comments used non-action condemnations, and roughly one 
half of these also referred to actions. Moreover, non-action items often alluded to 
actions (e.g. killer, murderous). 
The vast majority of victim items referred to the fetus as explicitly human: the top 
three items baby, child, and human comprised 75% of all. Victims were also identified 
in 77% of comments. Perhaps surprisingly, using a collocate analysis looking at the 
modifiers of baby and child as a proxy, it appeared that victim status was only seldom 
highlighted (e.g. innocent baby). Perpetrators were identified moderately less often in 
53% of all comments. Moreover, they (e.g. Planned Parenthood) were sometimes 
pointed to in the headlines of articles which probably affects perpetrator identification 
in the comments. That does not necessarily mean that had not these perpetrators been 
mentioned in the headline the commenters would not identify a perpetrator at all. 
Nonetheless there was a perceptible difference between victim vs. perpetrator 
identification, and perpetrators also demonstrated somewhat higher lexical diversity. 
I speculated that this may be due to a coordination difficulty which arises from the 
perception that several perpetrators play a causal role in affecting (in most cases) a 
single unambiguous victim. It could also be that the justifications given for the 
wrongness of specific actions require that one is able to point to a victim, and that 
perpetrator identification is less relevant for this purpose. In other words the action is 
wrong regardless of who does it, but it is not irrelevant who is potentially victimized 
by it. Finally, disgust elicitation, expression, and references to punishment were 
observed, but they played a merely miniscule role in condemnation. 
Overall, the style of condemnation in my sample was highly homogenous. Abortion, 
according to most of the data, was thought of as the murdering or killing of a baby or 
child enabled by Planned Parenthood or Democrats. This is in line with Dillon’s 
(1993) finding that both pro-life and pro-choice arguments given by their respective 
organizations are of low argumentative complexity.11 It might be reasonable to assume 
                                                    
 
11 Argumentative complexity was measured by differentiation and integration: “[d]ifferentiation refers 
to the number of dimensions or aspects to the question that are taken into consideration…and integration 
refers to the extent to which conceptual connections are developed among the differentiated dimensions 
of judgment” (Dillon, 1993, pp.305–6). For example, an argument can differentiate the involvement of 
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that most of the commenters would describe themselves as pro-life at least if forced to 
identify with one or the other position. If that is accurate, my data taken as a whole 
would certainly indicate low complexity in that there are only few dimensions taken 
into account in condemnation, especially with respect to actions and victims. This does 
not, however, provide us with information about the complexity of other possible pro-
life views (see e.g. Marquis, 1989). In fact it might be difficult to even consider these 
online comments as proper arguments. 
The lack of complexity was also observed on twitter by Sharma et al. (2017). One of 
the major themes in their sample was “Abortion is murder” in which the top words 
were kill, murder, wrong, life and baby. A similar pattern can be seen in my data as 
well, since kill, murder, and baby were the top three words used in condemnations. 
O’Rourke (2016) and Bourgeois (2013) both pointed out that pro-life discourse in 
Australia and Canada does not take into account the female perspective in pregnancy, 
but rather highlights the status of the fetus as a person: a baby, child, or human. This, 
too, is confirmed by my data as these were the top three victim words used. 
One element that appears to be at the heart of the abortion debate as described in this 
paper is the personhood of the fetus. The effect of humanization was even tested by 
Mikołajczak & Bilewicz (2015) and it was found that the choice of word (child/fetus) 
can affect decision making with respect to the permissibility of abortion. But 
importantly the humanization of the fetus is not necessarily only a device used by 
those leaning towards the pro-life position. It may reflect a conceptualization process 
that translates to real behavior: some women reported that they were able to go through 
with abortion only after perceiving the fetus as non-human (Kirkman, 2011, p.125). 
The fact that the discourse I focused on is computer-mediated can affect some of the 
language characteristics I observed. For one, while anonymity in discussions can have 
some positive effects (like increased participation), it can also cause disinhibition, 
polarization of and conformity to the views in the community, and encourage extreme 
or unkind expression of opinions (Thurlow, Lengel, & Tomic, 2004, pp.62–64; Ho, 
2008, p.194). To some degree, these could be connected to the harshness of the 
                                                    
 
a fetus and a woman in abortion, and then integrate the concept of rights: how to find balance between 
the fetus’s right to live and the woman’s right to make decisions about her own body? 
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vocabulary used because the social cues that can inhibit aggressive and impolite 
behavior are missing in this online setting (Ho, 2008, pp.200–1; Neurauter-Kessels, 
2011, p.199). Similarly, if online commenting as a medium somehow influences 
conformity of views among the likeminded, this can be reflected in the homogeneity 
of condemnation styles. Homogeneity and the lack of persuasive efforts (e.g. short 
comments, little focus on consequentialist arguments, harsh style) in my data is also 
consonant with an earlier finding that people’s purpose in comment sections is to 
mainly publicize their attitudes while interaction with others is not as important 
(Freund, 2011, pp.27–32). The online environment also makes trusting the sex 
indicated by the commenter’s username difficult, and due to this I will not discuss the 
apparent difference between men’s and women’s commenting frequencies (usernames 
are not verified in any way, women could be more likely to comment anonymously, 
etc.). 
Finally, there are some limitations that need to be addressed. My purpose was to study 
how abortion is morally condemned. However because condemnation is very rarely 
expressed explicitly I used negativity as a proxy: comments that described abortion in 
a negative fashion (explicitly, by substitution, etc.) were included for analysis. But 
negativity faces a similar issue. Negative typically means something undesirable, and 
murders, killings, infanticide, etc. usually are. However there is no satisfying way to 
unequivocally determine what is always undesirable or negative, and negativity is, 
neither, explicitly stated. I will have to assume that the reader will simply agree with 
me about the negativity of the descriptions I have focused on. Otherwise singling out 
any subset of comments from the set of all comments based on virtually any semantic 
criterion seems decidedly impossible. 
Another issue was the anonymity of commenters. The Washington Times and The 
Western Journal do not require readers to comment under a username and in fact 60% 
of the analyzed comments were anonymous. Therefore I could not exclude all possible 
subsequent comments left by the same person. Assuming the same rate of duplicate 
users that was observed when people posted under a username, I should expect another 
12 comments to be ineligible for analysis. This only amounts to 3.3% of the analyzed 
comments, which is insignificant and would not affect the results. However it is very 
difficult to assess what the actual number of duplicate users would be because I simply 
46 
 
 
cannot know. It is even possible that some commenters posted several comments under 
different usernames. 
Though the data was collected from conservative news outlets, I do not believe it can 
be straightforwardly extrapolated to represent conservatives or those identifying as 
pro-life, nor their arguments. These comments only reflect spontaneous reactions 
(which is of course what I set out to study), not careful reasoning processes. There 
could also be selection effects of some kinds: for example, people with a different 
commenting or condemnation style may not be motivated to leave comments in the 
first place (for whatever reason). 
Because I only studied spontaneous reactions, it is also unclear to what degree this 
data can be taken to be representative of moral reasoning itself. As far as I can tell, 
there has not been almost any work combining EP with discourse studies, and EP very 
rarely–if at all–considers language use in the manner that would be immediately 
relevant to CDA (manipulation, persuasion, emphasis, omission, nominalization, 
presupposition, etc.: see contents in e.g. Dunbar & Barrett, 2007; Buss, 2016a; 2016b). 
Therefore, as a general matter, it seems that not a lot is known about the link between 
discourse and cognition, and how they translate to behavior and thus cause social 
effects (though Hart, 2011; 2013 have initiated this work). I assumed that how human 
moral cognition functions would, to some degree, be manifest in language use. That 
assumption rested on the straightforward idea that in order to coordinate action 
(especially before a conflict), we must use linguistic means to signal our views and 
affect the views of others. However because my focus was narrower than people’s 
condemnation style generally, there is some disconnection: I did not aim to capture 
action words as such, but rather those action words that are used to describe abortion 
or can be substituted for it. Therefore e.g. “do something so horrible [an abortion]” 
would count as non-action in my analysis although doing clearly refers to action. 
Similarly, words like murder can perhaps often be used without explicit reference to 
victims and perpetrators because they might be implicitly assumed. In other words the 
way we make sense of such words in the first place could be by expecting victims and 
perpetrators to be involved. Thus, even if cognitive moral templates require victims, 
they are not necessarily identified when people talk (as opposed to reason) about moral 
judgments. 
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5.2. Biology in being critical 
It is not a new idea that understanding our moral selves as creations of biological forces 
might help us grasp and solve social problems (Alexander, 1985, p.17). Given the 
acute social and political nature of CDA, one might expect that such understanding 
would be highly relevant. After all, it seems rather obvious that in order to 
meaningfully address social issues–which fundamentally consist in human behavior–
one needs to actually understand human behavior. By looking at not only surface level 
linguistic representations but also underneath at the machinery generating them, we 
may observe that what we believe is right may only be a way to coalign with 
likeminded others; we may be biased to focus on action rather than inaction or 
consequences; we may strategically humanize or even invent victims; we may blame 
whole groups for the transgressions of only some of their members; and in whatever 
way we utilize these tactics could be motivated at least in part by self-interest rather 
than legitimately ethical considerations. CDA has seemingly been slow to integrate 
sciences of the mind to the study of discourse with few exceptions (Hart, 2005, p.189; 
Chilton, 2005, pp.22–24; Wodak, 2006, p.181), which could hinder its explanatory 
powers. But a more fundamental point is that CD analyses themselves could be 
motivated by self-interest instead of noble and selfless pursuits for social equality. 
Recall that there is no reason to expect that following our moral intuitions leads to a 
better world for everyone (they could do the opposite12), because they were not 
designed for that purpose in the first place. It is not obvious why we should assume 
that CD analysts are different type of people whose political interests are not self-
serving. Only focusing on discourse, and not people, then, may not be the most 
efficient way of inducing the kind of social change CDA should be aiming at. 
My analysis (and the previous research I reviewed) shows that abortion is 
conceptualized as a wrongful act of killing against a human entity–at the very least in 
some conservative or pro-life circles. I do not make claims about what kind of social 
effects (if any) are potentially brought about by this discourse. But because people are 
highly motivated to debate abortion, it could be worthwhile to think about better and 
worse ways to change other people’s minds. It may be tempting to attempt to show 
                                                    
 
12 For instance, moral rules that enforce group loyalty in tribal warfare can enable a band to coordinate 
successfully against another, i.e. kill the men and capture the women (Pinker, 1997, pp.513–516). 
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what is incorrect about definitively linking fetuses to humans, abortion to murder, and 
murder to wrongness. One might also try to argue that abortion is not murder, since 
the concept of murder appears to drive much of condemnation. But is reasoning an 
effective means of changing minds in this case? We saw that anti-choice women can 
find abortion acceptable due to self-interest (Wiebe et al., 2005). I made the 
preliminary and limited observation that abortion can be seen as a good thing by some 
(presumably) conservatives if done by illegal immigrants. Just over half of those who 
identify as pro-life believe that abortion should be permitted when the pregnancy is a 
result of rape or incest (Gallup, 2019)–though whatever causes a pregnancy seems 
irrelevant when condemnation is based on the perception that abortion is the murder 
of a baby. This last observation is also interesting in that pro-life people will be more 
accepting of abortion when it is the result of involuntary sex, suggesting again that 
opinions about abortion are associated with mating behavior (Kurzban, 2010, p.194). 
Attitudes, then, can change. But change, at least in these cases, does not appear to be 
driven by ethical reason. 
Whether or not the type of discourse I have displayed here is effective in furthering 
the pro-life political goals, the goals are still there nonetheless. Of course, it is difficult 
to talk about the exact political aims of a collective because people within it will not 
necessarily align with respect to their opinions. Some may only want to use persuasive 
means to decrease the abortion rate while keeping it legal (by, for example, showing 
pregnant women their ultrasound images: Silverstein, 2010, pp.3–4). But some do 
want to ban the procedure or at least not support its availability. Quite paradoxically, 
those who benefit from access to abortion services may also be opposed to them, which 
could have political implications: 
 
The fact that some women who have had abortions do not believe that 
other women should be allowed to have abortions might explain the 
difficulty in achieving widespread support for continuing access to 
abortion services in North America. (Wiebe et al., 2005, p.250) 
 
It may seem reasonable that if some people truly see abortion as the murder of a baby 
they would want to criminalize the procedure in an attempt to reduce its frequency. It 
appears questionable, however, that criminalization would be an effective means for 
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that purpose. Legal restrictions are not associated with fewer abortions, and indeed 
more permissive legislation coincides with lower abortion rates (Sedgh et al., 2008; 
Wise, 201813). This does not necessarily mean that abortion rates would not decrease 
as the result of criminalization. But even if legal restrictions lowered the rate of 
abortion, that has to be placed in juxtaposition with the adverse effects: restrictions are 
associated with more health risks which translate to substantial health care costs and 
even deaths (WHO, 2019). These issues should be relevant to anybody trying to 
increase the collective well-being of any society. 
If it is the case that restricting abortion rights would not lead to a lower abortion rate–
and especially if it would increase–the worry about babies being murdered would no 
longer be a valid justification for criminalization. However, if the real reason for anti-
abortion attitudes is (influenced by) something else, those people would nonetheless 
want the procedure outlawed. This is because banning abortion would still be a way 
inflict punishment on perceived moral transgressors. The justifications given would 
have to change, though, in order to remain plausible. Conversely, the reasons given 
for the legality of abortion rarely appear to be that the costs of having sex should be 
as low as possible–though tax-funded and safe services combined with prevailing 
social acceptance would surely help. Instead, we are asked to be worried about 
something more humane and virtuous, like women’s freedom to choose what they do 
with their own bodies (see Kurzban, 2010, pp.206–17 for the fuller logic of this way 
of thinking). If self-interest influences or even determines our political and moral 
beliefs, it is not clear how effective argumentation is as long as people’s interests are 
not aligned. 
 
 
 
                                                    
 
13 Wise (2018) reviews a report by The Guttmacher Institute who have received funding from Planned 
Parenthood. While this could often be considered a warning sign of biased research, the Sedgh et al. 
(2008) paper nonetheless had consonant findings. 
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to introduce a biologically derived notion of morality to the 
study of discourse. My purpose was to show that morally condemnatory language 
would reflect the underlying details of how morality is cognitively implemented. 
Evolutionary theory of morality suggests that it is a device whose purpose is to 
coordinate action: because partisan side-taking in conflicts can increase risks for both 
parties, ubiquitous condemnation enables people to punish perpetrators in favor of the 
victim regardless of their identities. This is why I hypothesized that condemnation of 
abortion should be mainly expressed in terms of actions that are readily represented 
by the mind and which are already likely to be generally condemned. Moreover, 
because moral judgment templates include victims and perpetrators, victims should 
often be made more salient in order to further the strategic aims of condemners. 
CDA approaches typically focus on analyzing language effects that are deemed 
counterproductive from the perspective of the analyst–or the apparent values of CDA 
itself–with respect to some political goal. Some analysts themselves have suggested 
that the claims critical analysts make about the social repercussions of language use 
might not always be well substantiated (Chilton, 2005; Jones, 2007). But more 
importantly, some portion of CDA could be seen just as motivated by self-interest as 
the discourses they criticize are. While I do believe that there are worse and better 
solutions with respect to abortion legislation, the strategic nature of moral 
condemnation suggests that all opinions–including those of critical analysts–should 
be, at least initially, considered in some measure as motivated by self-interest. This is 
why I decided that insofar as this paper has a real critical element to it, it does not 
come from advocating for political solutions. Rather, my intention was to evaluate 
people’s views and primarily the language used, along with pointing to possible 
complications that may be caused by the desire to prohibit the act of abortion even 
when it can lead to detrimental consequences. 
Some ideas for further research emerge here. A controlled experiment was conducted 
to see if attitudes towards abortion can be modulated by specific lexical choices 
(child/fetus: Mikołajczak & Bilewicz, 2015). Could attitudes be affected if abortion 
was described more in terms of actions than non-actions, for example when both are 
nonetheless condemnatory? The focus we appear to put on actions might also be taken 
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to suggest that abortion would be less condemned when the result of inaction–though 
it is quite difficult to imagine a situation like this. A simpler hypothesis could be that 
not having children as a life decision is less condemned than terminating a pregnancy, 
even when justified identically. 
Attitudes may also shift based on the identity of those having abortions, but this 
prediction needs to be much more carefully developed than the slight observation I 
made about comments relating to illegal immigrants. Because restrictive legislation is 
not associated with lower abortion rates (Sedgh et al., 2008; Wise, 2018), but is 
associated with more health care costs (WHO, 2019), criminalizing abortion may not 
be an effective means of reducing their number. If it is true that abortion is sometimes 
opposed because its illegality would be a punishment to people with more 
promiscuous mating behaviors, criminalization would still be supported even when it 
does not save more fetuses. This effect and the basic features of condemnatory 
language I observed are expected to be similar universally, because modern humans 
share most of the evolutionary history during which complex adaptations developed. 
Therefore it would be useful for further research to address possible cultural variation 
and what may cause it. 
Finally, it remains to be seen if disgust elicitation can be linguistically used in 
persuasion. For example, there appear to be some moral domains where disgust is 
more implicated in than anger (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 200, p.644). Disgust 
elicitation has been linked to increased moral condemnation, but in the studies I have 
cited disgust has not been elicited linguistically. Developments like these could be 
used to better justify some foundational claims found in CDA–e.g. that language use 
has significant social effects. But as a social approach, CDA might also benefit from 
understanding some of the psychological motivations underlying discourse itself. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Lexical items used in condemnation. 
 
ACTIONS 
ITEM INSTANCES 
murder 134 
kill 133 
infanticide 15 
slaughter 13 
butcher 9 
genocide 9 
rip 4 
take 4 
destroy 3 
destruction 3 
child sacrifice 2 
discard 2 
eliminate 2 
end 2 
exterminate 2 
harvest 2 
hurt 2 
remove 2 
slice 2 
suck 2 
tear 2 
abort 1 
act 1 
blood sacrifice 1 
chop up 1 
crush 1 
deed 1 
dice 1 
discriminate 1 
do (something so horrible) 1 
do in 1 
eradicate 1 
ethnic cleansing 1 
homicide 1 
63 
 
 
human sacrifice 1 
leave (alone to die) 1 
oppression 1 
procedure 1 
produce (baby parts) 1 
pull out 1 
put (to death) 1 
rip apart 1 
snuff out 1 
spill (blood) 1 
squash 1 
suction 1 
terminate 1 
turn (into bloody slush) 1 
volunteer (life) 1 
wipe out 1 
TOTAL 378 
 
 
VICTIMS 
ITEM INSTANCES 
baby 160 
child 54 
human 24 
the unborn 11 
black people 9 
innocence/innocent 6 
life 6 
fetus 5 
person 4 
future 3 
infant 3 
people 3 
woman 3 
ambiguous (e.g. those, you) 2 
individual 2 
kid 2 
offspring 2 
animal 1 
anything (that is young and helpless) 1 
‘bad decision' 1 
defenseless 1 
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folks 1 
illegal alien 1 
liberals 1 
minorities 1 
mistake 1 
mother 1 
newborn 1 
own progeny 1 
people of color 1 
poor people (of other races) 1 
potential voters 1 
self 1 
society 1 
the poor 1 
the unwanted 1 
themselves (the left) 1 
TOTAL 319 
 
 
PERPETRATORS 
ITEM INSTANCES 
Planned Parenthood (incl. leader, 
president, head, etc.) 
44 
ambiguous 26 
Democrats 21 
illegal aliens 11 
liberals 11 
"pro-abortion" people 10 
woman 9 
the left 8 
mother 7 
we 6 
Nancy Pelosi 5 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez 4 
doctor 4 
Ilhan Omar (Rep.) 3 
America(ns) 2 
communists 2 
Hollywood 2 
John Roberts 2 
politicians 2 
abortion industry 1 
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abortion mills 1 
abortion providers 1 
ACLU 1 
adults 1 
baby-eater 1 
big money making movie companies 
(Disney, Netflix) 
1 
biological father 1 
communist left 1 
companies that profit from child 
entertainment (e.g. Disney) 
1 
Congresswoman 1 
Dem Party leadership 1 
Female impersonating dopplegangers 1 
genocider 1 
Marxist/Communist pro-murder 
bunch 
1 
Mr. Edwards 1 
New York 1 
New York's leaders 1 
Ohioans 1 
our government 1 
parents 1 
people 1 
people with agendas 1 
policies 1 
pro-choice 1 
sacrificer 1 
The Modern Progressive Movement 1 
the socialist 1 
US Congressional Hispanic Caucus 1 
Vermont 1 
TOTAL 209 
 
 
NON-ACTION WORDS: ADJECTIVES AND NOUNS 
Adjectives 
ITEM INSTANCES 
evil 8 
murderous 4 
baby-killing 2 
disgusting 2 
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murdered 2 
wrong 2 
abhorrent 1 
baby murdering 1 
baby-butchering 1 
bad 1 
barbaric 1 
blood thirsty 1 
brutal 1 
genocidal 1 
Ghoulish 1 
ignorant 1 
incomprehensible 1 
murdering 1 
not humane 1 
not responsible 1 
not right 1 
racist 1 
sad 1 
selfish 1 
terrible 1 
vile 1 
worst 1 
TOTAL 41 
 
Nouns 
ITEM INSTANCES 
death 12 
killer 7 
murderer 6 
evil 5 
slaughterhouse 3 
abomination 2 
sin 2 
animal cruelty 1 
baby-eater 1 
black blot 1 
bloodshed 1 
cruelty 1 
disgrace 1 
example 1 
exterminator 1 
fetus 1 
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forced-deather 1 
genocider 1 
hemoclysm 1 
horror 1 
loss (of a child) 1 
madness 1 
racism 1 
sacrificer 1 
shame 1 
TOTAL 55 
 
 
MODIFIERS 
ITEM INSTANCES 
gruesome 3 
pure 2 
satanic 2 
abortion 1 
barbaric 1 
bloody 1 
cold blooded 1 
deliberately 1 
disgusting 1 
downright 1 
effectively 1 
evil 1 
excruciating 1 
flat out 1 
great (big) 1 
horrendous 1 
horrific 1 
legalized 1 
lethally 1 
literally 1 
monstrous 1 
more 1 
most 1 
necessary 1 
pagan 1 
simple 1 
societally acceptable 1 
subtle 1 
68 
 
 
unfettered 1 
unrepentant 1 
TOTAL 34 
 
 
Appendix B. Articles and URLs. 
 
The letters in the ARTICLE column stands for the news site (B for Breitbart, D for 
The Daily Wire, WT for The Washington Times, and WJ for The Western Journal). 
ARTI
-CLE 
URL 
B1 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/31/planned-parenthood-scolds-cnn-dnc-
for-excluding-abortion-issue-during-debate/  
B2 https://www.breitbart.com/entertainment/2019/07/23/nyt-hollywood-depicting-
abortions-at-record-levels/  
B3 https://www.breitbart.com/entertainment/2019/07/17/unplanned-opens-strong-in-
theaters-across-canada-despite-being-labelled-hate-propaganda/  
B4 https://www.breitbart.com/entertainment/2019/07/15/michael-moore-says-prayer-for-
the-overthrow-of-trump/  
B5 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/17/report-ousted-planned-parenthood-
head-incompetent-manager/  
B6 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/21/hispanic-caucus-trump-illegal-aliens-
cancel-abortions/  
B7 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/18/sudden-ouster-of-planned-parenthood-
physician-president-desperate-attempt-to-regain-political-power/  
B8 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/21/youtube-star-gamer-ninja-thanks-mom-
for-choosing-life-over-abortion/  
B9 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/23/rep-ilhan-omar-calls-abortion-access-
illegal-aliens/  
B10 https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2019/07/16/social-justice-and-identity-politics-
leader-named-planned-parenthood-acting-president/  
D1 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49989/mccarthy-right-life-foundation-freedom-
itself-kevin-mccarthy 
D2 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49318/cineplex-chief-tells-protesters-against-pro-
life-hank-berrien 
D3 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49618/bovard-planned-parenthood-has-revealed-its-
true-rachel-bovard  
D4 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49419/watch-powerful-video-takes-pro-abortion-
talking-amanda-prestigiacomo  
D5 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49503/watch-famous-gamer-ninja-reveals-he-was-
almost-paul-bois  
D6 https://www.dailywire.com/news/50205/black-female-activist-abortion-racism-paul-
bois  
D7 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49195/two-independent-canadian-theater-owners-
receive-paul-bois  
D8 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49935/walsh-there-nothing-hypocritical-about-
being-pro-matt-walsh 
D9 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49946/hollywood-pushing-abortion-record-levels-
paul-bois  
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D10 https://www.dailywire.com/news/49561/breaking-planned-parenthood-president-
removed-hank-berrien 
WT1 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/8/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-rips-
georgia-heartbeat-ab/  
WT2 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/19/alyssa-milano-abortion-
boycotts-fail-gain-traction/  
WT3 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/12/vermont-make-abortion-
fundamental-right/  
WT4 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/14/alabama-senate-passes-bill-
making-abortion-felony/  
WT5 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jul/12/activists-perform-watermelon-
abortion-netroots-nat/  
WT6 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/22/trump-admin-bars-federal-
funding-abortion-clinics/  
WT7 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/mar/16/new-mexico-democrats-sink-
extreme-abortion-bill-af/  
WT8 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/7/john-roberts-joins-liberal-
justices-supreme-court-/  
WT9 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/27/missouri-abortion-bill-126-
called-strongest-pro-li/  
WT10 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/2/democratic-presidential-
candidates-come-their-sens/  
WT11 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/mar/12/abortion-is-the-social-justice-
issue-of-the-millen/  
WT12 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/may/6/abortion-bills-opposed-black-
hispanic-democrats/  
WT13 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/6/addison-woosley-13-jeered-
during-anti-abortion-spe/  
WT14 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/3/disney-netflix-accused-
hypocrisy-georgia-abortion-/  
WJ1 https://www.westernjournal.com/actress-postpones-georgia-show-claims-anti-
abortion-law-new-slavery/  
WJ2 https://www.westernjournal.com/celebrities-protesting-georgia-abortion-laws/  
WJ3 https://www.westernjournal.com/prominent-pro-lifer-perfect-response-comedian-
calls-evil-piece-s/  
WJ4 https://www.westernjournal.com/supreme-court-ducks-case-on-alabama-
dismemberment-abortion-ban/  
WJ5 https://www.westernjournal.com/court-deals-blow-abortion-industry-rules-trumps-
family-planning-program/  
WJ6 https://www.westernjournal.com/illegal-minors-us-custody-cant-denied-abortion-
court-ruling/  
WJ7 https://www.westernjournal.com/michigan-hotel-wants-help-state-women-get-
abortions/  
WJ8 https://www.westernjournal.com/nyt-comes-new-phrase-replace-fetal-heartbeat/  
WJ9 https://www.westernjournal.com/nancy-pelosi-alabama-republicans-choose-abortion-
family-member-raped/  
WJ10 https://www.westernjournal.com/colorado-secretary-state-reached-planned-
parenthood-help-condemning-al-abortion-law/  
WJ11 https://www.westernjournal.com/ben-carson-responds-ilhan-omars-attack-uses-
abortion-claims/  
WJ12 https://www.westernjournal.com/jim-carreys-brutal-pro-abortion-drawing-backfires-
earns-thank-pro-life-movement/ 
WJ13 https://www.westernjournal.com/church-vandalized-pro-abortion-graffiti-upset/  
WJ14 https://www.westernjournal.com/democratic-governor-ready-break-party-lines-sign-
heartbeat-bill-report/  
 
